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The previous two decades have brought to light many issues with the role 
of the United Nations in peacekeeping. The disasters in Rwanda, Kosovo, 
Somalia, and now the Sudan, give credence to the idea that something is a 
serious fundamental flaw in the United Nation's approach to making the world a 
more peaceful place. The use of violence, or the threat of violence, cannot be 
used to bring about lasting peace. 
Evidence of this fundaniental flaw is seen throughout the UIV's history, but 
perhaps nowhere as glaring as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. That peace 
enforcement operation ran just as the framers of the UN Charter intended it to. 
lraq invaded Kuwait; the Security Council met; sanctions were imposed; a 
decision was made that an international coalition would have to force lraq from 
Kuwait. This goes hand in hand with the prescribed responses to threats to 
international peace and security as outlined in the Charter. Despite this seeming 
"success", Iraq is today immersed in war and violence. 
The UN has broadened its definition of what peace is, but they have not 
changed their peacekeeping tactics enough. As long as they rely on force to 
achieve peace, the inevitable result will be more violence. 
There are areas where the UN has tried to address the roots of conflict 
and expand its view of peacekeeping, for example, development. However, their 
approach to development is similarly flawed as it encourages development that 
will be beneficial to the developed world, not the developing countries. The UIV 
should be advocating sustainable development and not pushing a capitalist 
agenda. 
Only through the use of nonviolence can the UN hope to achieve its goal 
of peace. The reliance on coercion will only lead to resentment. If the UN 
continues to use violent means to attempt to achieve noble ends, they will send 
the message that violence is the final arbiter of justice. That lesson will lead to 
increased need for peacekeeping and .the circle will continue. 
Nonviolence can, and does, work. It has not been tried on a sufficient 
enough scale to fully judge its merits in the international peacekeeping arena. 
Violence rarely works and always leads to more violence. The cycle of violence 
can be traced throughout history. Given this, the UN must change its approach 
to peacekeeping to incorporate nonviolence as its dominant theme. 
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Chapter 1 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE GOALS AND VALUES OF THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY 
The United Nations began the decade of the 1990's with what some 
claimed was their most successful peacekeeping mission ever.' The argument 
for this claim was that the United Nations and the Security Council responded to 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as they were designed to. However, the continued 
violence in Iraq is, in and of itself, enough to refute this particular claim. Add to it 
the less than inspiring UN performance through the rest of the decade in Somalia, 
Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor, and it becomes clear that there is a problem 
with UN peacekeeping. 
The record of UN peacekeeping in both interstate and intrastate conflicts 
has always been a precarious one, but when the results of what many at the UN 
considered an operation that worked as it was supposed to turns out so terribly, 
one has to question the very theory behind, and certainly the methods of, UN 
peacekeeping. In short, the UN's approach to peacekeeping is fundamentally 
flawed. 
UN rhetoric is in line with what peacekeeping should be about (i.e. 
development, sustainability, eradication of poverty) but its actions are 
contradictory to this rhetoric and damaging to the overall search for a peaceful 
world. The first major flaw in UN peacekeeping is the UN's reliance on the threat 
of military force. This reliance is in direct opposition to the quest for peace. The 
lesson they are teaching the world is that violence and military force are the 
ultimate manifestation of power. It is a lesson that has been taught throughout 
centuries with dreadful consequences, particularly in the 20th century. 
1 Cameron R. Hume, The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peacekeeping Changed 
(Bloomington 1994) 3.  
The UN should not rely so heavily on the use of military force, or the 
threat of force, as a tool for peacekeeping. Until they stop doing so, the need for 
their conventional (i.e. threat based) peacekeeping will continue to grow as it has 
over the last two decades. If the UN intends to truly address the issues behind 
conflict, the bulk of its resources should be directed with what we do know in 
mind: violence leads to more violence. Therefore, the use of violence in 
peacekeeping is in opposition to the fundamental goals of peacekeeping. 
To understand the inherent problems with threat-based peacekeeping, 
one should first understand ,the goals and values of the UN. Although there is 
considerable evidence that the creators of the UN intended it to be more than a 
vehicle towards peace, its primary stated goal is to create peace. While the 
motivations.of many of the major world powers at the time can be called into 
question, it is my belief that the vast majority of countries and vast majority of 
people at the UN do indeed, to borrow a phrase from the American military, 
consider peace to be their profession. 
The values of the UN are also openly stated, if open to interpretation at 
times. Self-determination, human rights, economic sustainability, fairness, 
equality, these values are genuinely shared by most at the UN regardless of the 
agenda of the powerful developed states. Nowhere in the UN Charter does it 
mention balance of power or geopolitical goals and values. It stands to reason 
that if the UN is to live up to its stated goals and values, it should be 
representative of the people who are intimately involved in achieving those goals 
and upholding those values, namely, the people of the world as opposed to their 
governments. 
Once one defines the goals and values one can address what types of 
power the UN has at its disposal to achieve them. It is clear that threat power is 
used as the final arbiter, but far from the only, or the strongest, power the UN 
could wield. To fully understand the error of the UN's ways in its approach to 
peacekeeping, it is necessary to discuss the types of peacekeeping currently 
employed and the pros and cons thereof. Under the title of "Peacekeeping" falls 
everything from development and humanitarian assistance, to sanctions and full- 
blown military intervention. To understand how this came about, it will also be 
necessary to look at the evolution of LIN peacekeeping, in particular how it has 
evolved since the end of the Cold War and what many considered a successful 
entry into the decade of the 1990's. 
To adequately show why the UN should not continue its present course, it 
is imperative that one tries to understand the roots of conflict. Is violence 
inevitable? Do humans have a propensity for this behavior? While history may 
appear to lend some credence to answering yes to these questions, it can 
alternatively show us both the structural violence within the system we have 
created and the use of nonviolence as an effective and powerful peacekeeping 
tool. Much of these two areas are not featured prominently in the history books, 
but they have a compelling story to tell. Humans do not need to behave violently 
and structural violence is not inevitable. 
Next, how does one define peace? The definition has also evolved over 
the years from simply the absence of war to more holistic meanings that address 
the environment and the structural violence within our world system. One cannot 
reasonably provide a roadmap to peace if ,there is not a definition of what that is 
and an awareness of what threats face the creation of peace. 
Finally, UN peacekeeping must be evaluated in three broad areas: 
Prevention, Response, and Post-Conflict. Many of the peacekeeping methods 
will be cornnion to all three, indeed there needs to be a consistent overall vision 
that addresses all three in a consistent manner as inextricably linked to each 
other. From recognizing early warning signs and sustainable development, to 
the rights of women and the environment, the UIV must address these issues if it 
wants to address the roots of conflict. 
While many will argue, correctly, that the UN does much of this through its 
development and aid agencies, it could be argued that while they are helping 
with one hand, with the other hand they are hurting the cause of peace and 
ultimately undermining their own peace efforts by using force and the threat of 
force to address issues .of violent conflict. Many may also contend that such an 
approach as the one advocated in this thesis defies the reality of the global 
system. Perhaps they are correct, but no approach to peacekeeping will be 
realistic unless it acknowledges one basic fact: violence will always lead to more 
violence. 
As one would expect, the values and goals of the UN are inextricably 
linked to each other. However, the actions of the UN are at best mixed in moving 
towards achieving these goals. As stated above, the approach is fundamentally 
flawed. In order to suggest changes to the approach, it is necessary to 
understand the values of the UN and the goals that spring from them. It is 
necessary to begin with the broad goals of the UN, work towards the specific 
goals as outlined in the Millennium Development Goals, and finally address the 
goals of UN peacekeeping. 
The values of the UN are peace, human rights, self-determination, rule of 
law, protection of the environment, and economic and social well-being.2 The 
goals that derive from these values are, of course, the same. Peace and security 
113 for the world, "to save the world from the scourge of war ... , a normative 
2 Nigel D. White, The United Nations System: Towards International Justice (Boulder 2002) 47-72. 
United Nations Charter, Preamble (New York, 1945) 1. 
definition of human rights, self determination for all peoples and the expectation 
that they can live under a just system with an equal rule of law, to protect and 
sustain the environment, and to insure that everyone can live an economically 
viable life. All of these goals are noble and worthy of the world's attention 
These are things that an organization such as the UN should be working on. 
However, the approach must be consistent with the goals. 
Ultimately, peace is the primary goal of the UN. Everything the UN does 
should lead towards 'this goal. The Millennium Development Goals are intended 
to be the means towards that end. The list of 8 specific goals to achieve by 201 5 
is far-reaching and ambitious. They are: 
1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger- Reduce by half the 
proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day. Reduce 
by half the proportion of people suffering from hunger. 
2. Achieve Universal Primary Education- Ensure that all boys and 
girls complete a full course of primary schooling. 
3. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women- Eliminate 
gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably 
by 2005, and at all levels by 201 5. 
4. Reduce Child Mortality- Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate 
of children under five. 
5. Improve Maternal Health- Reduce by three quarters the 
maternal mortality ratio. 
6. Combat HIVIAIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases- Halt and begin 
to reverse the spread of HIVIAIDS. Halt and begin to reverse 
the incidence of malaria and other major diseases. 
7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability- Integrate the principles of 
sustainable development into country policies and programs; 
reverse loss of environmental resources. Reduce by half the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water. Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers, by 2020. 
8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development- Develop further 
an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, 
predictable and non-discriminatory. Includes a commitment to 
good governance, development and poverty reduction - 
nationally and internationally. Address the least developed 
countries' special needs. This includes tariff and quota free 
access for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily 
indebted poor countries; cancellation of official bilateral debt; 
and more generous official development assistance for 
countries committed to poverty reduction. Address the special 
needs of landlocked and small island developing States. Deal 
comprehensively with developing countries' debt problems 
through national and international measures to make debt 
sustainable in the long term. In cooperation with the developing 
countries, develop decent and productive work for youth. In 
cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to 
affordable essential drugs in developing countries. In 
cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits 
of new technologies -especially information and 
communications t e c h n ~ l o ~ i e s . ~  
These goals are clearly well worth achieving. The problem comes when 
the UN's efforts are at cross-purposes. If one can argue that the chief goal of the 
UN is to promote peace, then one may also be able to assume that the actions of 
the UN will be primarily towards that end. Therefore, these goals have a larger 
goal in common: peace. One could argue that the UN sees these goals as the 
way to peace. Looking at the descriptions of each goal one might conclude, due 
to the detail, that development is the primary path towards peace. This is 
important because it shows that the UN understands what needs to be done to 
create the culture of peace that must exist in order to achieve a sustainable 
peace. The UN has even made steps in the direction of achieving these goals. 
Many of the UN agencies are designed specifically to do so. However, one area 
in particular has not seen its actions fall into line with the rest of the UN's stated 
philosophy; that is the area of peacekeeping. 
United Nations Development Goals- www.un.orglrnilleniurngoalsl 
Chapter 2 
PEACEKEEPING, POWER, AND REFORM AT THE UN 
The authority for UN peacekeeping comes primarily from Chapters VI and 
VII in the UN charter, which give the Security Council the authority to seek the 
peaceful settlement of disputes15 the use of sanctions16 or the use of force.7 This 
is balanced against strong wording protecting the sovereignty of individual states. 
This tension has often paralyzed the United Nations. In order to understand what 
one is talking about when one says "peacekeeping", it is time for some definitions 
as per the UN. 
Peace Operations - Peace support operations (includes 
preventative deployments, peacekeeping and peace enforcemelit 
operations, diplomatic activities such as preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peace building as well as humanitarian 
assistance, good offices, fact finding and electoral assistance). 
Peacekeeping - Hybrid politico-military activity aimed at conflict 
control, which involves a UN presence in the field (usually involving 
military and civilian personnel), with consent of the parties, to 
implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating 
to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.), 
and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) and/or 
to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief. Also referred to as a 
Chapter Vi operation. 
Peacemaking - Refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade 
parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement of their dispute. Excludes the use of force. 
Peace Building - Includes all external efforts to assist countries 
and regions in their transitions from war to peace, and includes all 
United Nations Charter, Chapter VI, articles 33-38. See Appendix A. 
6 . .  
~ b ~ d ,  Chapter VII, article 41. See Appendix A. 
7 .  
 bid, Chapter VII, articles 42-43. See Appendix A. 
activities and pro rammes designed to support and strengthen 
these transitions. B 
Peace Enforcement - (The UN does not specifically define Peace 
Enforcement on its website, so I will use Roland Paris' definition 
from his book, At  Wars End.) The threat or use of non-defensive 
military force to impose, maintain, or restore a cease-fire.g 
It is apparent that peacekeeping encompasses many different actions that 
the UN can utilize, from diplomacy to military enforcement. Peacekeeping, as 
defined above, is what one would consider "traditional peacekeeping1'. Both 
sides consent to the involvement of UN troops and state sovereignty is respected. 
Traditional peacekeeping is what was primarily seen during the Cold War. 
The veto power of the U.S. and the Soviet Union created a stalemate in the 
Security Council that all but paralyzed the UN and its ability to respond to 
conflicts. Consent was of primary importance. The fall of the Soviet Union at the 
beginning of the 1990's changed things considerably. As mentioned before, 
many called the handling of the IraqIKuwait conflict the first successful mission, 
progressing as it was designed to, resulting in an international coalition to stop 
Iraqi aggression. However, the resultsof that operation have led directly to the 
current war in Iraq and are evidence that the UN's designed response to 
aggression is fundamentally flawed. 
A second change that has taken place in the peacekeeping field is the 
change from interstate to intrastate conflicts as the focus of the UIV. While the 
UN has managed to keep the world powers from directly fighting each other, 
there have been dozens of wars where the world power fought by proxy in the 
guise of other less powerful but strategically important sovereign nations. 
United Nations Glossary - www.un.org/glossaryl 
Roland Paris, At Wars End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge 2004) 38. 
The removal of the consent requirement from the UIV peacekeeping 
lexicon has opened up the UN to intervene in intrastate conflicts. One might 
expect this as the world becomes more interdependent through trade and 
communications technology. Intrastate conflicts have profound impact on other 
countries in terms of the environment and refugees, as well as safety and 
security. 
This new direction in peacekeeping comes with many unwanted 
consequences. The United States is now the world's sole superpower and has 
considerable political, economic, and military control over the actions of the 
United Nations. Because of this, there is significant danger of the UN being 
seen as a tool of the U.S. in its attempt to control the balance of power and 
maintain its world hegemony. The damage to the UN's reputation, so vital if it is 
to achieve what it hopes to achieve, will be substantial if this belief is allowed to 
continue. Therefore, the UN must not, in any way promote the agenda of the U.S. 
above its own. In all situations, it must be conscious of not deferring to the U.S. 
This is particularly irr~portant in terms of development. The UIV1s complicity in 
liberalizing trade and opening markets through their development programs will 
betray and therefore erode the trust of developing countries. 
The new direction in peacekeeping often referred to as, "complex 
peacekeeping operations," has led to comparisons between it and colonialism. 
There are considerable parallels. Both use force to create social and/or political 
change. Also, the powerful "liberal democracies" see the interventions as being 
in both their national interest and the interests of the native populations. Control 
of, or at least unfettered access to, natural resources is another disturbing 
similarity.1° 
'O Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace (New York, 2004) 6-7. 
The changes in UN peacekeeping are at the heart of the second major 
systemic flaw in UN peacekeeping; the idea that the method of economic 
development that will lead to a sustainable economy for developing countries is 
based on exports and open markets. By focusing on export markets, developing 
countries cannot produce the things they need to sustain the viability of their 
state. One would certainly not call for a new nationalism, or isolationist strategies 
on behalf of the developing states, but rather point out what common sense 
should make apparent, namely that a country that cannot sustain itself will never 
be able to compete on the world market with the developed countries of the world. 
The only market these countries will be able to compete in is cheap labor which, 
given the realities of the motivations of most multinational corporations, is not 
sustainable. A country that offers low wages will necessarily be undercut by 
other developing nations and the idea of sustainable development under these 
circumstances is a farce. 
Since the West, the United States in particular, is the major beneficiary of 
open markets, and since open markets necessarily mean stagnated or 
unsustainable development for indebted developing nations, the UN's complicity 
in this action enhances the charge of colonialism against the UN. This erosion of 
the UN's reputation will severely restrict its ability to provide humanitarian aid in 
developing nations because the citizens of those nations will legitimately 
question its motivatio~is and trustworthiness. 
In Iraq, the UN came under attack at least partly because it was seen as 
complicit with the United States' oil grab. Add to that the history of the oil for food 
program and the sanctions of the 1 9 9 0 ' ~ ~  and it is easy to see why the people of 
Iraq might not be all that thrilled to see the UN at their borders. 
In his essay, Turning Ploughshares Into Swords at the UN, Colin D. 
Edwards, refers to the UN as a "puppet" of the U.S. He further states that, "so 
subservient has the UN been made to American purposes that only a few of the 
member governments are addressing this issue in the forceful way they 
should."" 
This is not to say that everything that the UIV has done has been negative. 
They were the first, with their Human Development Report in 1990, to define 
development as including more than just the GDP of a country by adding adult 
literacy and life expectancy to create the Human Development Index (HDI).'~ 
This was a significant step in the right direction and should be commended. 
However, put this up against the other recent developments in the UIV's actions, 
and there is little cause for celebration. 
While the problems associated with the types of economic development 
the UN encourages will be discussed in more detail when development as a way 
of peacekeeping is discussed, it is important to state at this point that this 
approach to development is at least partly to blame for the severe increase in UN 
peacekeeping operations, which will continue to grow in the future if the same 
policies are cor~tinued.'~ 
Types of Power Available to the UN 
Referencing, Kenneth Boulding's, The Three Faces of Power, Michael 
Nagler, discusses the three types of power as (1) Threat power (2) Exchange 
power and (3) Integrative power." Both threat and exchange power pit one side 
against the other; threat power in a necessarily antagonistic way, and exchange 
Colin D. Edwards, Turninq Ploughshares Into Swords at the UN, War After War (San Francisco, 
1992) 161. 
Elise Boulding, Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History (New York, 2000) 200. 
l3 www.un.org 
l4 Michael N. Nagler, Is There No Other Way? The Search for a Nonviolent Future (Hawaii, 2001) 
44. 
power in a competitive way. Only integrative power, the power to bring people 
together, is non-confrontational. To understand how powerful integrative power 
is we need to understand which human needs are most important. In Human 
Nature-Revisited, biologist, Mary Clark, lists the top three as (1) bonding, (2) 
autonomy, and (3) meaning.15 These needs can help us to more fully understand 
the nature of conflict. For now it is just important to understand that there is a 
type of power that is constructive and not inherently divisive. 
Threat power is the power most often used by the UN in peacekeeping 
operations. It is also presented as the ultimate type of power as it is used as a 
last resort, theoretically if not in practice. It is presented as the power to be used 
against resistance on the part of belligerents to conform to international norms. 
Throughout history, nations have time and again resorted to threat power and the 
use of violence to get what they want. The UN, like the nations of the world, 
relies on this threat power as well. Failure to comply may result in economic or 
military devastation. 
The threat to send more weapons into a hostile situation to force 
corr~pliance seems somewhat illogical. For example, picture two people aiming 
guns at each other. The situation is understandably tense, even more so if they 
are already firing those guns. Now add a third person with a gun. Does the 
situation get more tense or less? Now each of the two belligerents have to keep 
an eye on the third person, despite their claimed neutrality, because they too are 
armed and therefore a potential danger. IVow, what if, instead of arming the third 
person, they are sent in without any weapons? The tension does not increase 
this time. While this is perhaps an oversimplification, the lesson holds true. 
Adding more potential violence to a tense situation does not reduce the chance 
of more violence, it increases it. 
Now, let us say that this armed person is successful in stopping the 
fighting by threatening to shoot anyone who does not do what they say. What is 
the lesson learned by the two belligerents? They learn that having more 
weapons would be a good thing if they want to get what they want. Ultimately, 
they learn that violence, or the threat of violence, is the quickest way to achieve 
their goals. The present day examples of Iran and North Korea bear this out. 
We have also recently seen the use of exchange power by the UN. The 
infamous "Oil for Food" program was a perfect example of this. "You give us 
some oil, and we'll give you some medical supplies and food (and money)." How 
did that turn out? The answer is in the paper every day. That is not to say that 
exchange power, unlike threat power, cannot be used for good intentions. The 
exchange of doctors for oil between Cuba and Venezuela is a winlwin situation 
on both sides that was entered into without coercion by either side. The problem 
with exchange power is that it can deteriorate into a perverse form of threat 
power; "I will withhold this froni you if you don't give me what I want". 
Integrative power on the other hand connects the two belligerents in a way 
that increases the chance that they will not want to resort to violence. Give 
people a real, sustainable community to belong to, allow them the right of self- 
determination, and basic freedoms and meaning will find them. The power of 
threats and exchange pale in comparison to integrative power, which addresses 
real, universal human needs. 
Reforms af the UN: Other Proposals and Their Drawbacks 
Reform at the United Nations is nothing new. This is not surprising as the 
UIV is an enormous organization that comes with a lot of bureaucracy and a 
variety of different views on the best practices to be undertaken. Some of these 
proposals are new, some are old; some are from within the UN, and some come 
from outside voices. 
The most popular proposal revolves around the make-up of the Security 
Council. The current proposals in this area come from a multitude of sources, 
but the most relevant are those made by the Secretary General's High Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, that was released in 2004. Their 
proposals for .the Security Council involve two different ideas for adding members 
to the Council, some permanent, some for shorter terms, etc.16 While their 
proposals are both comprehensive and detailed; they lack one key ingredient that 
must be a part of any reform of the Security Council, namely the veto power of 
the current five permanent niernbers. Any proposal that does not address the 
need to revoke the veto is a waste of time and energy. The major stumbling 
block in the Security Council's ability to act in a given situation is the veto. It can 
only act in situations where all five permanent members agree, or at least are 
willing to abstain. This is what paralyzed the Council during the Cold War, and it 
is what has led to unilateral actio~is by the United states." 
The only reform that will have any significant impact on the running of the 
Security Council would be one that the five permanent members will never allow, 
namely eliminating the veto. Therefore, any proposal that calls for expanding 
Report of the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 
" 1 do not wish to suggest that the UN could have done anything to stop the U.S.'s invasion of 
Iraq, but merely want to show that because the Council could not agree, states have decided to 
circumvent the Council. 
the membership on the Security Council without addressing the veto issue is 
limited. 
Proposals that involve changes in peacekeeping also abound. They 
usually fall into one of several areas or a combination thereof: Improving 
finances, increasing military capability, quick response capability, early warning 
systems, and development. 
Increasing the financial contributions, or at the very least getting countries, 
particularly the U.S., to live up to their expected contributions, is usually on 
everyone's list.18 While it is indeed a good idea, it relies on the coercive power of 
the U.S. and while all efforts should be made in this area, a better idea would be 
to lower the costs of peacekeeping operations by reducing their reliance on 
violent methods of peacekeeping. 
Michael O'Hal-~lon, in his book, Expanding Global Militaly Capacity for 
Humanitarian Inten/entions, calls for more military capability, as the title 
suggests.1g He is not alone. Nearly every report and reform suggestion calls for 
the UN to possess increased military capabilities. What should be obvious by 
now is that this proposal ignores the number one law of violence. As, Hannah 
Arendt, put it, "The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the 
most probable change is to a more violent world."20 One would think that after a 
century like the 20th, ideas like OIHanlon's would be obvious in their .flaws. 
The quick response reform usually accompanies the increased military 
capability suggestion. This is a throwback to the original idea that the UN should 
be allowed to have some sort of standing army. Other than concerns for ,the 
l8 This is a part of the SG's High Level Panel, a proposal by the World Peace Foundation, and in 
a book by Michael O'Hanlon, Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention, 
just to name a few from across the spectrum. 
Michael O'Hanlon, Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention 
Washington D.C., 2003) various pages. 
40 Nagler, 67. 
military aspects of this suggestion, there is also doubt as to whether the U.S. or 
other world powers would ever allow the UN to have significant military capability 
outside of the control of the major powers. 
Early warning systems on the other hand, are a very effective idea for 
several reasons. To begin with, many regional groups already have similar 
systems in place. The UIV can simply enhance and support ,them while acting as 
a sort of central base of operations. The chance to better the UN relationship 
with regional groups and grassroots Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is 
one the UN should take advantage of. The same things that make the UN a 
great place to coordinate efforts, its size and convening power, make it unable to 
act as swiftly and appropriately on the local level, which is where there are 
excellent opportur~ities for conflict prevention. The UN will need to rely on the 
assistance of the groups who in addition to being able to do the things the UN 
cannot, will have greater and more accurate local knowledge that will help 
immeasurably in conflict prevention. 
In addition to the fact that there are many early warning systems in place, 
the data that needs to be analyzed to identify potential problem areas is also 
readily available in most cases. A careful look at data on human rights, 
economic conditions and ethnic tensions, will go a long way to help the UN take 
action before the violence starts which is essential in the long run for the creation 
of a peaceful world system. 
Clearly, the UN already realizes that economic development is a key 
component to the development of peace. Their efforts have been considerable. 
The suggestion for more development money is a fine idea. Throwing money at 
a problem is never a waste of time unless that is all that is being done. More 
money for development would be very useful, but it will be of little help unless the 
UN stops supporting the creation of more violent peacekeeping missions to fight 
violence, and being complicit in the market liberalization plans of the developed 
world. 
Chapter 3 
ROOTS OF CONFLICT, ROOTS OF PEACE 
Why do humans resort to violence time and time again? What issues are 
at the roots of all of this conflict? It stands to reason that the best way to address 
the conflict and reach an acceptable solution is to understand why there is 
conl:lict in the first place. Reactionary responses, although at times 
understandable, do little if anything to address the underlying causes of the 
problem. One sees this with the United States' attempt to eradicate the terrorists 
by killing them as a solution to a problem that is systemic, not specific to 
individual terrorists. The United States' approach is doomed to failure and, once 
the real roots of conflict are seen, doomed to increase terrorism and violence in 
our world. 
Nagler describes war as, "mass It is the same, although in 
different degrees of magnitude, as the schoolyard bully. He lashes out because 
of fear or insecurity. That fear and insecurity lead to anger and the need to 
blame others. Ervin Straub, in his essay, Genocide and Mass Killing: Their 
Roots and Prevention, describes the root of conflict as, "intense life problems in a 
society," such as, "severe economic problems, great political conflict, rapid and 
substantial social change and their  combination^."^^ 
Compare this theory with that of, Michael Bhatia, in his book, War and 
Intervention: lssues for Contemporary Peace Operations, who gives the root of 
conflict as the struggle for power,23 whether that power is political power or 
- 
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economic control of resources. As Bhatia states, this is in the context of the 
threat of interstate wars. In other words, a suggestion of what makes one state 
attack another. While this may have been true during the Cold War, the prime 
issue for UN peacekeeping today is intrastate conflict. Bhatia suggests reasons 
for the increase in these types of conflict since the Cold War as well. He 
suggests the following: 
1) Prior to collapse (state collapse into hostilities); few of these 
governments were internally legitimate, with a typically long 
tradition of tyranny. The authoritarian regimes relied on a wealth of 
aid to maintain elite patronage networks and a harsh government 
security apparatus. Democracy was rhetorical rather than real. 
The population was denied basic services (health, education, and 
infrastructure), while elites typically siphoned off resources and aid 
wealth for personal enrichment. 
2) The end of Cold War military and fi~iancial assistance instigated 
a breakdown in existing, typically dictatorial, domestic power 
structure. In a reversal, as illustrated by David Laitin in the post- 
Soviet successor states, external influence also proved to be a 
decisive factor in the emergence of ethnic conflict, providing the 
crucial catalyst toward substantive armed insurgency. 
3) Debt relief for governments in transition was subject to 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank loan 
conditionality, as imposed by structural adjustment and economic 
liberalization programs to reduce government spending, which 
typically led to the government focusing its remaining resources on 
the military. Privatization and free trade proved additionally 
detrimental in countries wi.thout the legal str~~cture to prevent the 
rise of oligarchs and crime syndicates. Mark Duffield argues that 
"rather than promoting stability," globalization and market 
deregulation "has helped illiberal and quasi-feudal forms of political 
economy to expand." 
4) The societal ramifications of these authoritarian systems further 
contribute to the causes of war, from mass unemployment and 
environmental decline (deforestation and water shortages) to third 
world health crisis, which includes the spread of HIVIAIDS and 
other diseases. For Frances Stewart, conflict is driven by the 
existence of "horizontal inequalities," namely, "inequality in political, 
economic, andlor social conditions among culturally and/or 
geographically distinct groups." 
5) Beyond colonial economic exploitation and even the advent of 
neo-colonialism, Mahmood Mamdani identifies the "institutional 
legacy" of colonialism as one source of contemporary conflict.24 
Bhatia is quoted at length because it is important to show that the end of 
the Cold War has brought about a change in thinking concerning the roots of 
conflict. While there were certainly people discussing the economic state of the 
world and exploitation of developing countries as the roots of conflict before the 
end of the Cold War, it has now taken the forefront, at least in rhetoric. Also, it is 
important to show how closely the UN's own interpretation of the roots of conflict 
echo those of academia. While there is, of course, debate over the roots of 
conflict, the case made by the UN, Mary Clark, and others, is gaining in 
acceptance every day. 
The Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, lists many reasons for the roots of conflict. They state that it is known, 
"all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades 
ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war." They continue to state that 
the threats include, "poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; 
war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, 
radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational 
organized crime."25 
They also recognize that the threats are connected and have no national 
boundaries. They recognize that poverty is, "strongly associated," with civil 
wars,26 noting that since 1990, the number of people living in extreme poverty 
24 Bhatia, 33. 
25 Report of the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 1 
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has increased by more than 100 million people.27 They note also that countries 
are falling back into conflict after the peacekeepers leave and then the countries 
fall off the Security Col-lncil's radar.28 What does this say about UN peacekeeping 
efforts? They are not long-term solutions. 
Criticism in the report claims that neither the UN nor the International 
Financial Institutions are set up to treat these threats in an integrated, coherent 
way.2g It also indicates that neither is designed to help countries before the 
outbreak of war, or after in the process of rebuilding.30 This leads to the question: 
When is the UN fit to help bring peace? Without adequate military resources, 
according to traditional thought, it is not the best choice to intervene while a 
conflict is going on. According to its own High Level Panel, it is not well suited to 
help either before or after a conflict. 
Combine the above with the inadequate results of a peacekeeping mission 
that went as it was designed, IraqIKuwait, and it is clear to see that there is a 
crisis in UN peacekeeping. While O'Hanlon and others will use this evidence as 
support for their case to add more military capabilities to the UN peacekeeping 
operations, it is a flawed argument. UIV missions do not fail because there are 
not enough weapons. Instead, they fail, at least in part, because they rely too 
heavily on weapons. Similarly, UN development programs do not fail because 
they do not have enough money, but because the rest of the UN's actions are not 
consistent with the development goals. 
Returning to the roots of conflict as determined by all of the above cited, it 
seems that they all lead to Mary Clark's analysis. Bhatia's list of post-Cold War 
causes is similar to that of the High Level panel. Both discuss the specific details 
27 Report of the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 24. 
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of what is at the heart of Clark's analysis: lack of belonging, crisis of meaning, 
and lack of autonomy. 
The three are linked. Lack of belonging occurs under repressive 
governments in which the people have no power (i.e. lack of autonomy). Crisis 
of meaning comes from lack of hope experienced by people who lack basic rights 
and justice. Push people far enough and they will push back. 
The UN, although not in control of the INIF, the World Bank, or the WTO, 
is complicit in the goals of these instit~~tions by pushing for both market 
liberalization and a focus on exports, as stated in the Millennium Development 
Goals. This complicity is in direct contrast to the stated goal of creating 
sustainable economies in developing nations. The reliance on exports in one, or 
at best, a few products, limits the sustainability of the economy because the 
resources of the country flow out of the country creating an unhealthy reliance on 
a particular commodity. If demand for that commodity slows, the country is in 
danger of economic ruin that could, depending on the country, have global 
consequences. The only competitive advantage left to these countries is cheap 
labor, which simply moves to the next country when wages begin to creep up. 
Capital is more flexible in its ability to move across borders than is labor. When 
that capital leaves, there is no sustainable economy left. No investment advisor 
in the world, that truly had the interests of their client in mind, would suggest that 
a client focus all of their assets in one area. Yet, the UN encourages the 
dependence on exports, as opposed to building self-sustaining infrastr~~cture- 
based industries that reduce the country's reliance on the developed countries of 
the world. 
If the UN wants to address 'the roots of conflict, which it should if it wants 
to create a culture of peace, it must not simply forward the agenda of the 
developed nations. The UN should strongly criticize the policies of the IMF, 
World Bank, and WTO and act as an advocate for true development based on 
sustainability. 
If war is indeed "mass insecurity" as Nagler claims, the UN must also stop 
using the threat of force to implement change. Threats do not in any way add to 
feelings of security, rather they add to feelings of insecurity. If the roots of 
conflict are a lack of belonging, lack of autonomy, and a crisis in meaning, are 
military solutions doing anything to address these issues? 
Does a military intervention add to someone's feeling of belonging? It is 
difficult to see how. The destruction of their community will instead make them 
feel even less connected to the world community than they were before the 
addition of more violence. The death of a loved one will make them feel less 
connected to humanity. 
Does military intervention add to a person's feelings of autonomy? On the 
contrary, the feeli'ng that they are not in control will become intensified. The only 
way to regain some degree of control would be to take part in the violence. At 
least that is what they are being taught by those trying to gain control through 
military force. An occupying power, no matter how well intentioned, will in no 
way add to their feelings of autonomy. 
Does military intervention solve an individual's crisis of meaning? In 
reality, there will be an increased crisis of meaning, combined with the above two 
factors, which will inevitably create the potential that the person will seek this 
meaning elsewhere. They may find some ~near~ing in a terrorist organization, or 
a revolutionary group, which will continue the violent cycle. 
There is also the issue of economic insecurity. Does ,the UIV's support of 
market liberalization and exports do anything to address that insecurity? In 
developing countries, people are forced to go through the humiliating process of 
picking through garbage dumps to get pieces of plastic or metal that they can sell 
in order to survive. Does the export of resources provide a long-term solution for 
this situation? 
The UN does some good things in the area of development, but by 
undermining that development at the same time, it continues the race to the 
bottom. The Iblillennium Development Goals will be a mere memory by 2015 at 
its current pace. It is time for the UN to focus a majority of its efforts on 
confronting the true roots of conflict, not merely the results of them. 
The support of many people for violence against others is also an issue. 
Our society minimalizes the impact of violence by desensitizing us to its effects. 
Movies, television, shock radio, toys, guns, even SUVs suggest the virtues of 
violence as a means to an end. This structural violence is at the heart of our 
violent society, which sets the standards for the rest of the world.31 
Structural violence hides behind the scenes and influences us in covert 
ways. The following chart displays the differences between the types of violence. 
Direct Violence 





Acute insult to well-being 
Intermittent 
Su bject-Action-Object observable 
Intentional and immoral 
Episodes may be prevented 
Str~~ctural Violence 





Chro~iic insult to well-being 
Continuous 
Su bject-Action-0 bject unobservable 
Unintentional and amoral 
Inertia may be mitigated3* 
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While one can debate the specifics of the above definition, particularly the 
intentionality of structural violence, the key point to be taken is that str~~ctural 
violence is commonplace and many people seem to be apathetic towards it. 
The UN does its best to try to stop direct violence, but until it addresses 
the structural violence in a meaningful way, the incidence of direct violence will 
continue to rise. Combine this with the fact that somebody somewhere is 
profiting from the system and its structural violence (and will fight for it), and one 
begins to see the problems facing the UN. Despite the daunting depth and 
breadth of these problems, the UN must continue forward in a consistent way. 
The UN clearly recognizes the systemic violence and wishes to address it, but its 
methods lack clarity and a common direction. The UN is simultaneously fighting 
the violence and contributing to it, on both the direct and structural level. 
This stresses even more the need for the UN, and others who wish to 
create a culture of peace, to have a coherent, consistent approach to addressing 
the structural violence that the system is built on. 
Types of Peace: Where Should the UN Be Going? 
In their essay, Creating Global-Local Cultures of  Peace, Linda Groff and 
Paul Smoker define six types of peace.33 They are listed in what they say is an 
evolutionary order ranging from peace as the absence of war (negative peace) to 
Holistic Inner-Outer peace (positive peace). 
33 Linda Groff and Paul Smoker, Building Global-Local Cultures of Peace, 
www.gmu.edu/academics/pcs/smoker.htm 
Peace as the Absence of War 
This self-defining type of peace is still prevalent among the general 
pop~~lation a d among world leaders. While still a worthy goal, current world 
conditions suggest that it is not nearly enough. It is necessary, however, for the 
other types of peace to flourish and take root. To someone on the receiving end 
of bombardment, this type of peace would be a welcome one. However, creation 
of a lasting peace, which this is not, takes far more than simply the absence of 
war. 
The UN has had some success in this area. Its presence has prevented 
hostilities in many different conflicts and continues to do so today. Once the UIV 
leaves, as the High Level Panel noted, the likelihood of returning to hostilities is 
high. Ultimately, this theory does not adequately address the intrastate problems 
that have become so prominent in the 1990's and beyond. 
Peace as a Balance of Forces in the International Svsteni 
The idea that war breaks out when there is a disruption to the balance of 
political, social, cultural and technological factors was first proposed by Quincy 
Wright in 1941 .34 His theory assumed that a change in one factor must be 
counteracted by changes in the other factors. For example, a major change, 
such as the introduction of nuclear weapons, results in a change in other factors 
within the system. 
This theory closely relates to the idea that increased economic 
interdependence will promote peace. While there are serious questions as to the 
accuracy of this belief, what is clear is that economic globalization has only 
intensified the civil problems within states. 
Peace as No Structural Violence 
Johann Galtung picked up on both the absence of war and balance of 
power theories and developed a third position that required the absence of both 
war and structural violence. Galtung described structural violence as violence 
caused by the way our social, economic, and political structures are organized. If 
someone dies for lack of medicine and the very medicine they needed is 
available somewhere else, that is structural violence. An alternate organization 
of the resources could have prevented that death. 
While there have been advances in humanitarian aid to address some of 
the problems created by structural violence, little seems to have been done to 
address the structural violence itself. As stated earlier, humanitarian aid is a 
good thing, but it is only a band-aid, and will ultimately fail without a change in 
the current structure, a structure that is supported by the UN. 
Feminist Peace 
Feminist peace theories emerged in the 1970's and brought the ideas of 
structural violence and negative peace down to an individual basis. These 
theories included violence against all people. It argued that all violence against 
the individual must be eradicated to create a peaceful planet. 
It also addresses the hierarchal relationship between human beings and 
calls for its elimination. The human rights of individuals, particularly women, 
must be addressed in order to create any level of peace beyond the absence of 
war. As the first head of the World Health Organization's Programme on AIDS, 
Dr. Jonathan Mann, was quoted as stating in the Los Angeles Times, "even if all 
the envisaged educational and control programs were implemented in developing 
countries, they would fail to halt the impending catastrophe because they do not 
take into account human rights issues, especially the rights of women."35 
Holistic Gaia Peace 
Holistic peace theories emerged in the 1990's as a way of taking violence 
against the environment into account, viewing humans as one of many creatures 
inhabiting the planet and addressing the interrelationship between all things. It 
was an important step in realizing the connection humans have with ,their 
environment, emphasizing the fact that it is not, as has been the typical approach 
in Western civilizations, simply a resource to exploit. 
Environmental concerns have much to do with the economic devastation 
in much of the developing world. The constant and ever increasing over 
consumption of resources by the developed countries has devastated 
environments and robbed indigenous people of adequate environmental 
resources for survival. 
Holistic Inner-Outer Peace 
The final type of peace as seen by Groff and Smoker involves a necessary 
spiritual component. It is the idea that outer peace must be based on inner 
peace or it will not have the necessary foundation. It is critical to understand that 
what this spiritual inner peace may entail is different for everyone. It is not, 
specifically, a particular religion, but rather a realization that inner peace, which 
could be defined as 'meaning' is important for creating cultures of peace that 
have s~~stainable foundations. It is in keeping with UNESCO's definition of a 
culture of peace as; "one that cannot be imposed upon anyone, but must develop 
out of the culture."36 
These six types of peace could have profound implications for the UN. 
The UIV must update its definition of peace and its actions. It recognizes that 
peace is more than the absence of war, but its actions are not entirely consistent 
with this realization. 
'The 'Threats to Peace 
The Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change lists the following as the major threats facing the international community, 
and thus, the United Nations in the 21st century: 
1) Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious 
disease and environmental degradation 
2) Inter-state conflict 
3) Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large- 
scale atrocities 
4) Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons 
5) Terrorism 
6) Transnational organized crime3' 
Economic and Social Threats 
Economic and social threats are in all likelihood, the major cause of 
conl:lict in the world today. The lack of development opportunities for developing 
nations and their people rob them of any sense of belonging to anything, of any 
sense of control over their own lives, and of any sense of meaning. This is quite 
devastating alone, without mentioning the economic and social hardships that 
come with this lack of opportunities. 
The amount of poverty worldwide is enormous and growing. 1.t is 
estimated that there are nearly three billion people living on less than two dollars 
a day.38 Even taking into account the different levels of purchasing power a 
dollar has in other parts of the world, this is not nearly sufficient. The problem is 
compounded by several factors, all related to the International Financial 
Institutions, the IMF and the World Bank. 
First is the fact that the World Bank and lNlF insist on Structural 
Adjustment Programs that require the developing country that wants to receive 
assistance to make certain changes. A typical program would include making 
paying the service on their debt a priority. From a purely fiscal standpoint this 
- - 
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might, on the s~~r face appear to be sound advice. But the results are devastating 
and lead to a vicious circle of debt and destruction. 
The focus on debt service payments requires the already financially 
troubled country to go further into debt to pay its loans. The further the country 
falls into debt, the more austere become the req~~irements imposed by the IMF 
and World Bank. They require cuts to already inadequate social programs 
(although not military spending) in favor of paying debt service fees. The spiral 
begins to spin, but is far from done. 
The next requirement would be to open markets to foreign investment and 
ownership. In other words, all the value in the country either in resources or 
capital flees, most likely to a developed country. It is also encouraged to focus 
on exporting those products that it has a "competitive advantage" in. This is 
invariably cheap labor. This focus on exports, as supported by the UN, also 
causes capital flight while leaving only cheap labor as a possible resource. The 
cheap labor lasts for a while until wages begin to rise and then .the capital flees to 
a neighboring developing country and the original country is left with nothing. 
The spiral hits bottom. Currencies are devalued. Conflict ensues. 
As we have already seen, the UN's approach to this problem is lacking 
any realistic vision for the outcome of its policies. The UN's focus is on the idea 
that interdependent countries do not go to war with each other. While there may 
be some evidence that democracies do not go to war with each other, this has 
not prevented them from attacking others. In addition, this idea does not address 
violence of structural level power relationships. 
The spread of infectious diseases, particularly HIVIAIDS, in developing 
countries has been almost as devastating as poverty. In addition to making any 
type of tourism almost impossible, infectious diseases also create an atmosphere 
of fear and mistrust which ultimately leads to conflict. The huge number of 
deaths devastates the local community's economy and its social framework, 
which leads back to a lack of belonging, autonomy, and meaning. The UN's 
approach to this has been better, but its reputation and any t r ~ ~ s t  it has been 
given in local communities is strained by its development actions. If the UIV 
wants to address these issues of disease, it must have the trust of the people it is 
trying to help. 
Environmental issues are just as important. Destruction of local ecologies 
in the search for resources to export is particularly devastating to local 
economies. Local farmers lose valuable land, water sources are polluted and 
then clean water is privatized, again harming the local economy. The Earth 
Charter is an excellent way for the UN to combat this environmental devastation. 
The Earth Charter lists four main principles: 
1) Respect and care for the community of life; 
2) Ecological integrity; 
3) Social and econorr~ic justice; and 
4) Deniocracy, nonviolence, and peace.39 
As one can see, the Earth Charter encompasses far more than just the 
environment. It recognizes the links between all of these issues and peace. It is 
interesting to note that the Earth Charter grew out of the United IVations World 
Commission on Environment and Development. 
Inter-State Conflict 
Inter-state conflict is still an important area of concern for the UN. Most 
peacekeeping missions tend to be intra-state related, but a quick look around the 
39 The Earth Charter is ava~lable at http:llwww.earthcharter.org 
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globe suggests that the threat of inter-state conflict is still very much alive. As we 
speak, Israel is occupying Palestine, the U.S. is occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, 
India and Pakistan are in a nuclear standoff, North Korea claims to have nuclear 
weapons, and the U.S. is threatening Iran, Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela on some 
level. The threat of interstate conflict is far from being resolved. As stated earlier, 
the UN's approaches to both interstate and intrastate conflict is flawed, and must 
become primarily based in nonviolence. As the area where the UN has possibly 
had the greatest impact in preventing conflict, the UN c o ~ ~ l d  learn from its past 
successes and failures here. 
Intra-State Conflict 
The roots of in.trastate conflict are so varied and deep rooted that the 
issues are often clouded. The major reason for the UN's inability to reduce the 
threat of these situations, other than its ultimate reliance on 'threat power, is the 
fact that the UN is not designed to handle local issues. As an international 
organization, it has unprecedented convening power and many other attributes 
that make it the ideal peacekeeping organization, but its size limits its local 
knowledge. 
This is where local NGOs and locally based early warning systems can be 
invaluable. Regional groups, such as the Organization of African States, can be 
perfect partners for the UN. They have local knowledge and are aware of local 
histories. They have the political will to prevent conflicts in their regions, unlike 
the major western powers that are only motivated when .they can profit, or if they 
stand to lose the ability to profit. 
The UN has begun working with these groups and should continue to do 
so, in addition to addressing the roots of conflict discussed earlier. Cooperation 
with local actors will go a long way towards preventing repeats of the 
peacekeeping disasters of the last decade. 
Nuclear, Radiological and Biological Weapons 
The threat of nuclear, radiological and biological weapons is a very real 
one. The UN has not been particularly successful in stopping the spread of 
these weapons, but should not take all of the blame. The UN is only as effective 
as its member states, in particular the five permanent members of the Security 
Council, will allow it to be. As long as the United States, Russia, China, France 
and England are producing and threatening with these weapons, the danger of 
their use will continue to grow. The UN will be able to do little to prevent it. 
The desire of terrorist groups and so called "rogue states" to acquire these 
weapons is directly related to the fact that the oppressive powers they wish to 
throw off also have these weapons. The theory behind this desire is that the 
weapons will act as a deterrent to preemptive attack. Again one comes back to 
the role of threat power in today's global political realm. The use of threat power 
causes those being threatened to seek deterrents that will prevent the actual 
carrying out of the threats. -This reality should be a glaring lesson to the UIV as to 
the ultimate futility of the use or threat of force. It simply causes those who 
cannot accept the situation the way it is to find a way to mitigate the threat with 
threats of their own. 
This too is an important point. Those struggling against the current 
political/economic system are given two equally poor choices between obeying 
those in power or being destroyed. Eventually, that situation will burst. The UN 
needs to be a model for other methods of confronting violence and changing the 
system. As long as the UN, the major vel-~icle for peace in the world, continues to 
use and support the use of violence, the results will be more violence. The 
proliferation of nuclear, radiological and biological weapons is, as stated above, a 
direct result of the violence in our world. 
Terrorism 
Terrorism is nothing new in the world. What is new is that the threat is 
now real to both the haves and the have-nots. In the words of the Secretary 
General's High Level Panel, "the mutual vulnerability of weak and strong has 
never been c~earer."~' Of course the Panel comes to an alternate conclusion as 
to how one should deal with these threats, but everyone can agree that they exist 
and that the threat is increasingly mutual. This is the new reality for the 
developed world. Much of the developing world has been living with multiple 
forms of terror for decades with hardly a glint of recognition from the powerful. 
September 11, 2001 was a wake up call to the developed world 'that terrorism is 
a boomerang, and that the violence of our policies has in ,turn made us a target 
for terrorists. The question that remains is: Has the UN realized this? 
The UN's approach to terrorism must address the reason why the 
terrorists are able to recruit people to give up their lives in this way. More than 
that, it must also address why terrorist groups enjoy widespread support, or at 
least a kind of understanding, in many parts of the world. Until these issues are 
dealt with, the UN's, and others', attempts to end terrorism will be met with more 
acts of terror. The current direction of global economic and political systems is 
fertile ground for terrorist groups. 
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Returning to the ideas of belonging and meaning discussed by Mary Clark, 
it is easy to see how they relate to terrorism. People do .not, in most cases, give 
up their lives if they have something to live for. It is a lack of meaning that 
causes suicide bombers to commit the ultimate act of violence (to both others 
and themselves). To be sure, they have a purpose and meaning behind their act, 
but it was the only one that seemed available to them, namely revenge. When 
people are treated in a subhuman manner, they lose meaning and lose their 
sense of belonging to the human community. These people are waiting for any 
sort of meaning to come along to fill that void. The terrorists offer them someone 
to blame; they offer them a sense of belonging to something greater. Given the 
alternatives, which are none or horrible, it is clear why people join, or at least 
support, these groups. 
This seems to be similar to the situation in Germany during World War II. 
Germany was humiliated and devastated by the Treaty of Versailles following the 
First World War. Hitler came along with a message that he was going to restore 
their dignity and gave them a group of people to vent their frustrations and sense 
of powei-lessness on. He was going to make Germany great again. He took 
advantage of the anti-Semitic feeling in ,the community and fanned the flames 
with rhetoric and propaganda. Many basically good people did things they would 
not have imagined doing in other circumstances. This is the appeal of terrorists 
and their message. 
The goal of the UN should be to take away the circumstances that give 
that message meaning. It should not try to counteract the message with 
propaganda and fear, but should really address .the issues that are causing 
people to sympathize with these groups. Most terrorists are already living in a 
world of fear and hopelessness; one cannot hope to change theirminds or 
diminish their numbers by adding more fear and hopelessness. The UN's 
approach to terrorism must be to restore hope and remove fear from these 
communities that are producing and supporting terrorists. 
An approach of this type will undoubtedly bring about charges of 
negotiating with terrorists. This simply spreads more fear and is 
counterproductive. The UN is fully aware of the conditions that are causing 
sympathy with .these groups. Of course, there will be those who will not change 
under any circumstances, but they should not be the focus of the UN's attention. 
The UN, by addressing basic economic issues can erode the support for 
terrorists, isolating them in their own communities. This approach not only 
addresses the underlying problems, which the current approach does not do, but 
also ends the cycle of fear and violence, which is necessary for ending terrorism. 
Transnational Organized Crime 
The threat of transnational organized crime comes in different forms. It 
may be drug trafficking, money laundering, or human trafficking. The Secretary 
General's High Level Panel makes several recommendations as to the forming of 
commissions and signing of international t reat ie~.~ '  All of them do little to 
address the issues. Again the UN should address the underlying cause for the 
problem. International organized crime exists for one purpose: to make money. 
Signing treaties and having commissions set up to discuss the problerr~ is 
not an effective approach. The UN, again, can only be as effective as it is 
allowed to be by member states. Too many member states are not complying 
with international law as it stands. One approach the UN could take is putting 
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international pressure on states that are lax in their enforcement. It would be a 
good start, but as with terrorism, the best approach for the UN would be to 
address the underlying issues that lead to these problems. 
As long as there is a demand for drugs, money laundering, and slaves, 
there will be people willing to provide these services if there is money to be made. 
In all reality, the UN can do little to stop people's desire for drugs. It is a problem 
much more suited to local actors. Money laundering is an issue of enforcement, 
and one that the UN is not suited to address. Human trafficking however is one 
that the UN can effectively address. 
Slavery is still a very real problem in the world today. These slave traders 
take advantage of the same conditions that the terrorists take advantage of. The 
devastating conditions much of the world's population live under give slave 
traders the necessary ammunition to take advantage of people's hope for a 
better life. Addressing these conditions will go a long way towards addressing 
the issue of human trafficking. 
The UN can also look at where .these people are being taken. Someone is 
profiting off the work these people perform. By following ,the money one will 
eventually find the ultimate source of the problem. Take away their ability to 
profit and it will reduce much of the world's traffic in human beings. 
All of these threats have common roots. The ever-widening divide 
between the wealthy rr~inority and the impoverished majority is ultimately the 
source for much of the threats to peace in the world. The UN, although not solely 
responsible for this widening gap, has been somewhat complicit in its actions in 
the area of development. The many good things the UN does are 
counterbalanced by their role in development that encourages the wealth and 
power divides to widen. 
The UN's use of violence and threats as the ultimate response to 
problems is also partly responsible for the condition of the world. Its use of the 
phrase "last resort" when referring to violence only gives credence to the belief 
that violence is the ultimate power. It is this philosophy that is responsible for 
much of the world's problems today. The UN was certainly not its originator, but 
if it wants to reach its stated goal of peace, it needs to be the leader in change 
towards a more practical and effective method. 
Chapter 4 
PREVEN'TION, RESPONSE, AND POST-CONFLICT ACTIONS 
The UN's focus should be primarily on conflict prevention. While post 
conflict issues and prevention issues are obviously very similar, they will be 
addressed separately for ease of organization. As with medical treatment, where 
the chances of successfully combating an illness are enhanced with early 
detection and prevention, the same applies in peacekeeping. The backbone of 
any UN prevention efforts must be an early warning system. Every report on UN 
reform seems to agree on this one issue.42 
There are already early warning systems in place in many areas of the 
world. The UN could work with these systems and work to improve them. It is 
importa~it hat the UN ,find local partners in .this endeavor for several reasons. 
First, the local partner will have a better sense of the reality of the situation 
on the ground. This is reminiscent of the situation in Rwanda where a high level 
delegation went to assess the situation and everything looked fine. The problem 
was that they didn't know what to look for or where to look for it. They therefore 
underestimated the dangerousness of the situation. This is an extremely 
preventable problem that cannot be allowed to happen again.43 
Next, the UN's structure is built in a way that makes it somewhat irnmobile 
and slow to react. The UN's role in the global early warning system can be as a 
42 Recommendations for an early warning system of some sort were mentioned by almost every 
source I read. A few of the more detailed were: "Coping with Internal Conflicts: Teaching the 
Elephant to Dance" by Kumar Rupesinghe in, The Future of the United Nations System: Potential 
for the 21S' Century; Dana Francis, in Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement: Conflict Inten~ention 
in Africa; "Agent of Change? The United Nations and Development" by Jaques Fomerand, in The 
United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society; Linda Groff and Paul Smoker, in, 
Creating Global-Local Cultures of  Peace; "Genocide and Mass Killing: Their Roots and 
Prevention" by Ervin Straub, in, Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21S' 
Century; and The Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 
43 For more on the Rwanda crisis, see Eyewitness to Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, 
by Michael Barnett, Cornell University Press, New York, NY, 2002. 
clearinghouse for information, and its convening power can be used to gain 
international support for whatever action is taken. However, care should be 
taken not to filter information from the field, as happened in Rwanda. The people 
on the ground were saying "genocide" and, for some reason, the message that 
got to the Security Council was "ethnic conflict."44 
A local, or at least regional, partner would be the natural choice for any 
action that may be taken, as they have the most political will and the most 
realistic chance of understanding the true nature of the mounting tensions. The 
UN has been working with NGOs and regional organizations for some time and 
should continue to build these relationships. 
The beauty of an early warning system is that much of the data that could 
be used to tip off the international community as to the potential for conflict is 
already kept. Economic trends, such as those kept by the World Bank and IMF, 
and social trends, such as those kept by Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch, are keys to a successful early warning system. In addition, many 
of the UN1s own publications report on this data as well. The United Nation's 
Development Programme's annual, Human Development Report, has much 
information that could be used to identify hot spots. Also the, World Economic 
and Social Survey, has valuable information. These flagship reports receive far 
too little attention and their information is far too often ignored or misinterpreted. 
Many of these reports have challenged the existing conventional wisdom on 
economic development and 
Once a problem is identified, the UN has many tools at its disposal, 
ranging from the Good Offices of the Secretary General, to multilateral 
44 Ibid. 
45 Jacques Fomerand, "Agent of Change? The United Nations and Development," The Unifed 
Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society, Jean E. Krasno, ed. (Boulder 2004) 
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negotiations and development assistance. As Secretary General, Kofi Annan, 
states, "our best preventative strategy is to support de~elopment."~~ Annan also 
mentions the need to build the public health capacities of the developing world 
and improved management of natural resources. 
The Good Offices of the Secretary General is one of the most valuable 
tools available to the UN. This is simply an invitation from the Secretary General 
to be the host of discussions between the opposing sides. The process is 
usually done quietly and without fanfare. This way both sides can present their 
views before the press and outside governments put their respective spins on the 
situation. This form of negotiation can go a long way toward building trust, both 
between the parties and between the UN and the parties. Also, the Secretary 
General can use the opportunity to assess the situation for her or himself. 
The High Level Panel states that, 
In the last 15 years, more civil wars were ended through 
negotiations than in the previous two centuries in large part 
because the United Nations provided leadership, opportunities for 
negotiation, strategic coordination, and the resources needed for 
implementati~n.~' 
While some may claim that this is due in part to the increase in civil wars, the 
most relevant lesson to be learned from it is that negotiation can and does work. 
But, it has a much better chance of working if the tensions are addressed early 
on. 
The recommendations of the Panel in the area of prevention are as 
follows: 
1 ) A .field-oriented dedicated mediation support capacity, comprised 
of a small team of professionals with relevant direct experience and 
expertise, available to all United Nations mediators; 
46 Kofi Annan, "Courage to Fulfill Our Responsibilities" The Economist, December 2, 2004. 
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2) Competence on thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations; 
such as the sequencing of implementation steps, the design of 
monitoring arrangements and the design of national reconciliation 
mechanisms; 
3) Greater interaction with national mediators, regional 
organizations and non-governmental organizations involved in 
conflict resolution; 
4) Greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of 
important voices from civil society, especially those of women, who 
are often neglected during  negotiation^.^^ 
These recommendations seem to stress local knowledge as an important tool to 
achieve success in peace negotiations. 
If there is a problem with negotiations, it is the reliance on threat force as 
the ~~lt imate solution. The UN loses credibility if it stresses the need for 
belligerents to refrain from violence while keeping violence as its ultimate device. 
The negotiating parties do not need another potentially violent actor to be added 
to the equation. Instead, they need to be able to trust that the UIV will be an 
orgar~ization whose involvement will result in justice and a reduction in the overall 
amount of violence, not as an actor who may, at some point, become one of the 
belligerents itself. 
The UN should follow the advice of the Panel and construct a field-based 
group of experts. Preferably these will be people who have been involved with 
successful nonviolent peace processes. For example, those involved with the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa immediately come to mind. 
Their knowledge of the potential pitfalls and how to effectively deal with them will 
be invaluable to any peace negotiation. Bringing these people into the 
negotiating room, as opposed to people from developed nations who have 
48 ibid, 38. 
"interests" in the area, sho~.~ld be preferred. It will lessen the potential suspicion 
concerning the role of the UN in promoting the developed world's agenda. 
Another important issue is preventative deployment. The Panel highly 
recommends it to the UIV as a method of controlling the potential for conflict. The 
danger, however, comes from the addition of weapons and potential for 
increased violence. In addition, the mandate of the armed peacekeepers is often 
unclear and ill defined. They are forbidden from using their weapons except in 
defense, when having the weapons is probably one of the reasons they would be 
attacked in the first place. In the few instances, such as Somalia and Kosovo, 
where UN troops were allowed to use their weapons as an offensive measure, 
the results have been disastrous. 
While supporting the idea of preventative deployment, one should 
understand that those who are deployed add very little to the situation if they are 
carrying weapons. Preventative deployments should be presented in the form of 
unarmed peacekeepers as well as those with expertise in peace negotiations 
and/or the local situation. Many will mention the case of Rwanda as a situation 
where, if the UN had been allowed to be more aggressive in its actions, it could 
have prevented genocide, and therefore, preventative deployment with armed 
peacekeepers can be justified. However, the root problem in Rwanda was in the 
poor assessment of the situation combined with a lack of political will among 
those who have the weapons. In short, the developed world just did not care 
enough to act when acting would have helped in prevention. 
This brings up another problem with preventative deployment; the' UIV is 
totally reliant on those'developed nations with weapons to support and organize 
a deployment. In contrast, unarnied peacekeepers require far less expensive 
equipment and can achieve the same goals, as the armed peacekeepers. In fact, 
they could achieve more. Thus, the UN would not have to wait for weapons from 
developed nations, and could respond to potential conflicts before they get too 
far out of control. While the developed world debates, and takes months to 
deploy the use of force, the situation will inevitably grow steadily worse. The time 
to address these issues is before they escalate. 
Responding to Conflicts: Nonviolence in  Action 
There will undoubtedly be situations where the attempts to prevent a 
conflict will fail. In those cases, it is more important than ever for the UN to do 
everything it can to refrain from using violence, even though there will be plenty 
of parties calling for violence. The UIV should be a consistent voice for peaceful 
intervention. Much as the success of the International Red Cross is reliant on the 
trust given to it by the international community, the UIV must also'be trusted to be 
of any real help in situations of conflict. If it holds the threat of violence over the 
conflicting parties, it will lose that essential trust. 
The major flaw in UN peacekeeping is its reliance on violence and the 
threat of violence to keep the peace. As Gandhi once said, "as the means, so 
the end."4g If those means rely on violence, the results will be predictable. 
History bears this out time and again. One conflict followed by another, ad 
nauseum, until the present day. 
The responses of the UN can range across the entire spectrum from 
negotiations to outright war and everything in between. The major focus has 
been to try to bring the two sides to the negotiating table and restore some 
semblance of peace. Halting the conflict and beginning negotiations between the 
two parties are valuable tools, but the UN reserves tlie right to approve military 
action if a settlement cannot be reached. Robert C. Johansen breaks down the 
range of UN responses as follows: 
- nonviolent to violent actions; 
- unarmed forces to heavily armed forces; 
- deployment with the consent of all parties, to the consent of one 
party, to the absence of meaningful consent; 
- low-cost to high-cost assignments; 
- small sized, single function forces to large, complicated forces; 
- forces composed of civilian monitoring experts, to those 
corr~posed of police personnel, to well armed military forces; 
- forces with a modest degree of internationalization to extensive 
internationalization; 
- diffuse command and control exercised by contributing states to 
centralized control in the hands of the Secretary-General; and 
- operations resulting in negative precedents and political learning 
to positive learning.50 
With this wide range of possible outcomes and responses, many of which 
are outside of the control of the UIV, it is easy to see why UN peacekeeping can 
be contradictory at times. Severely limiting the use of military force would 
simplify peacekeeping and, in many ways, improve it. The usual pattern is of UN 
peacekeeping is negotiations, sanctions, and force. 
Negotiations would be a continuation of the pre-conflict discussions. But 
negotiations do not always work and the reality is that violence may break out 
despite the best efforts of negotiators. This is a key time for the UN. How it 
chooses to respond will set the tone for .the intervention and the post-conflict 
situation. Responding with violence will inevitably lead to more violence in some 
form, at some time in the future. 
Sanctions have, in the past, been seen as a useful tool to force 
noncompliant states into line. However, the devastation of the Iraqi sanctions 
and those in Haiti have much of the world community thinking twice about this 
50 Robert C. Johansen, "Enhancing United Nations Peace-Keeping" The Future of the United 
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blunt and violent approach. All too often, it is the innocent civilians who bear the 
painful consequences of the sanctions while those in power who are targeted 
rarely feel their effects. For example, many Iraqis suffered from malnutrition and 
an increase in diseases due to the sanctions imposed there, while those in power 
lived more c~mfortably.~' 
Still, there are many in the international community, including those on the 
Secretary General's High Level Panel, who still see sanctions as a necessary evil. 
In their words, they are, "a necessary middle ground between war and words..."52 
The reality however, is that sanctions are a form of warfare and are in no way 
necessary. They are in all ways, a choice. 
Thus, following the disaster of the most recent sanctions, the new trend is 
"targeted sanctions" (note the violence of even the language). These are defined 
as financial, travel, aviation or arms embargoes. The idea that targeted 
sanctions do not affect the general population as much as complete sanctions is 
patently false. They still can and do have a devastating effect. Financial 
restrictions hurt the entire economy of the country. The economy is made up of 
the people. It is fundamentally impossible to impose financial sanctions on any 
scale without negatively affecting the general population. 
Travel restrictions similarly affect the entire country and cut off potential 
help from the outside. The country in question begins to feel more and more 
isolated from the world, forcing it into more and more desperation. Aviation (one 
assumes the UN means military aviation) and arms embargoes make some 
sense. However, it seems that someone, somewhere always manages to find a 
way to sell their weapons to these countries anyway. There is too much profit to 
White, 157. 
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be made for.the developed world to really enforce arms embargoes. Again, if 
there is no real political will, the UN is fairly powerless to intervene. 
Sanctions also have a way of getting more and more severe. In fact, the 
panel suggests that countries that violate sanctions should have "secondary 
sanctions" put on them.53 This seems to defy the logic of targeted sanctions in 
the first place. The Panel also recommends that humanitarian aid be available 
for countries under sanctions. The UN needs to be consistent in its actions. It 
should not impose sanctions wi.th one hand and provide humanitarian assistance 
with the other. Certainly this is not to suggest that the UN do away with 
humanitarian assistance, but rather, sanctions. 
The main problems with sanctions are that they are themselves extremely 
violent, they violate UN values such as human rights and equality, and they 
rarely if ever, work. In many ways, sanctions seem,to be worse than military 
intervention. The civilian population bears the entire impact, while the regime in 
power bears virtually none. That is not to suggest that the civilian population is 
not affected by military intervention, but at least military intervention directly 
affects the regime and not solely the civilians. Sanctions rarely affect the regime 
in power and always affect the general population. There is a distinct lack of 
logic behind sanctions. The UN recognizes that there is a threat to peace, but 
instead of taking definite measures, it tries to pick and choose which areas to 
target. In short, sanctions are half of an already ineffective effort. 
Military intervention is also unacceptable, as again, it is the civilian 
population that bears the majority of the impact. Power stations, bridges, water 
facilities, and other infrastructure become targets of full-blown military 
interventions. Clearly these violent acts lead to further violence down the road. 
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They leave the population desperate and without the basic necessities of life. 
Military interventions also violate the basic principles of the UIV because the 
greatest impact is always on the general population. 
The Panel has come up with conditions that must be met before the use of 
force can be authorized. The problem with them is that they are all very 
subjective. 
1) Seriousness of threat - Is the threatened harm to State or human 
security of a kind and sufficiently clear and serious to justify prima 
facie the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does 
it involve genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or 
imminently apprehended? 
2) Proper purpose - Is it clear that the primary purpose of the 
proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, 
whatever other purposes or motives may be involved? 
3) Last resort - Has every non-military option for meeting the threat 
in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing 
that other measures will not succeed? 
4) Proportional means - Are the scale, duration and intensity of the 
proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat 
in question? 
5) Balance of consequences - Is there a reasonable chance of the 
military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, 
with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the 
consequences of inaction?54 
As we will see shortly, at the very least, the third condition is never met. 
The UN and the international community have never really considered unarmed 
peace teams as a way to end conflict. Because of this, they do not truly treat the 
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use of military force as a last resort but rather the thing to do when one has run 
out of ideas. 
The other intervention that involves troops is what would be considered a 
traditional peacekeeping operation. UN peacekeepers are stationed between 
two belligerents to keep a peace that has been previously agreed upon. The UN 
soldiers can only return fire in self-defense, not in defense of civilians. In short, 
they can do little but stand there. Having guns only adds to the tension in the 
area and when fighting begins, the UN leaves. The case of Rwanda is a perfect 
example. When the genocide commenced, the UN began removing troops. 
In addition to being handcuffed by the mandate of the mission, these 
peacekeepers have no way to address the outbreak of more violence. It seems 
that the same things could be accomplished with unarmed peace teams. There 
are several ways these types of teams could work so that they would not add 
tension to the situation, but help to soothe the tensions instead. 
The questions are; how would nonviolence work as a method of 
intervention? What types of actions would .truly be the last resort and the 
ultimate use of power? The answers to these questions require one to look at 
nonviolence in general before going into details. One must understand the 
power of nonviolence to understand how it would work, and how it has worked. 
In "Peacemaking Through   on violence"^^, Michael Nagler lists several 
advantages to nonviolence over violence as a response to conflict. First, is the 
financial cost. The costs of war are incredibly high and the costs of 
peacekeeping are also too high when the ultimate tool is threat power, or force. 
Nonviolent peace forces would require far less funding and equipment. This 
would allow them to react more quickly as well. 
Second, the nonviolent peace forces would be more politically viable. It 
would be made up of volunteers, eliminating the need to petition world powers for 
forces and supplies, which necessitates waiting for them to decide to take action. 
This increased viability would also reduce response time in the Security Council. 
Third, is effectiveness. The only way the UN can affect a situation is 
through negotiations, which are beneficial, or through force, and then only after 
getting all five permanent member's approval. In short, the UN has a difficult 
time compelling nations to do what they want. IVonviolence does not compel, it 
persuades, insists, and focuses attention, and therefore can be used along side 
negotiations. Since the UN cannot realistically compel, they should rely on 
persuasion. Nonviolence turns this inability to compel into a n o n - i ~ s u e . ~ ~  
In addition to Nagler's points, it is important to note that nonviolent 
peacekeeping is also more in line with .the values and goals of the UN. Violence 
is ur~natural for the UN. It is not designed to be violent and reactionary, and it 
should take advantage of that and use the power it does have at its disposal. 
Let us now look at how one can define nonviolence using the same 
frames used when defining types of peace: general, bala~ice of power, structural, 
feminist, HolisticIGaia, and Holistic /Inner-Outer. 
Nonviolence can be seen as any act that helps to prevent war. This is a 
very limited view of nonviolence despite the inclusion of any act. Included in this 
category, would be threat power, even the threat of violent force. Therefore, this 
type of nonviolence is preposterous. One can, if desired, see any action as the 
"right" thing to do, but not all actions are nonviolent. 
The balance of forces that maintain the current power system can be 
greatly affected by nonviolent action. This relates more to the "power is fragile" 
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view of Gene Sharp and others.57 A system based on peace would also involve a 
crucial balance of forces to maintain the peace. This does not, however, address 
the structural violence. 
Before Galtung's theory on structural violence, many perceived the current 
system as a step towards peace. After all, increased interactions between states 
meant less chance of hostilities. Galt~~ng's a sertion that the system was violent 
itself changed all of this. Our world system, according to Galtung, can be violent . 
or nonviolent. The choice is ours, however none of these theories address, in 
depth, the micro level of nonviolence. They are primarily concerned with the 
macro view of world systems and nation states. 
Feminist nonviolence, on the other hand, like the feminist definition of 
peace, brings all relationships into the nonviolent sphere. Community and family 
relationships also can be violent or nonviolent. However, this feminist view does 
not ignore the macro level, it simply includes the micro levels as well. 
The Holistic, both Gaia and Inner-Outer, like the feminist model, stress 
"power with" as opposed to "power over". The holistic views extend this out to 
include all living beings and the environment. Nonviolence, to be complete, must 
include everything within our sphere. The Inner-Outer model also includes, as 
with the peace definition, a spiritual side. To be truly nonviolent, one must have 
inner nonviolence. It must be a way of life, similar to the Gandhian version of 
non~io lence.~~ 
Therefore, the evolution of nonviolence, like the evolution of the definition 
of peace, has expanded to become a life choice as opposed to a situational 
choice. The evolving definition has grown from being a lack of physical violence 
to being a totality of nonviolence. Sirnilarly, UN peacekeeping must evolve. 
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Unfortunately, recent events seem to suggest that peacekeeping is headed in the 
opposite direction. In order to be effective in creating nonviolence and peace, it 
must be complete in its acceptance of its principles. Within those principles 
should be the idea that violence cannot be used to create a culture of peace. A 
culture of peace is fundamental to world peace. Violence cannot, in any way be 
a part of a true culture of peace, as violence and peace are entirely mutually 
exclusive. 
The UN General Assembly has identified eight essential elements for a 
culture of peace. They are: nonviolence, respect for human rights, democracy, 
tolerance, promotion of development, education for peace, free flow of 
information, and wider participation of women.59 Military responses to violence 
do not fit within these criteria. 
In addition, nonviolence works. It is more than an ideal that sounds like a 
wonderful thing but, in practice, will not work. Many people, at this point, suggest 
the case of Nazi Germany as one where nonviolence would not have worked. 
There are several points that should be considered. Hitler was one of many men 
throughout history that have wreaked havoc. However, these men never acted 
alone. One way or another, they were able to convince others, usually many, 
many others, to join in their destructive vision. This relates back to the concept 
of the crisis of meaning. Why did these people support Hitler's murderous vision? 
The short answer is that Hitler gave them meaning, a sense of belonging, which 
he fostered by dehumanizing people who were different; he made people feel like 
they were in control again. 
Now imagine these people's reactions when others told them that this new 
sense of belonging was illegitimate. Add to this that the people saying this were 
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holding guns and the results are predictable and violent. On the other hand, 
there are many stories of spontaneous nonviolence working against the Nazis.60 
The key is that the Nazi soldiers were average people, not socio-paths. A 
nonviolent approach could, and where used, did have some success. Would it 
have changed the mind of Hitler? It probably would not have. But the other 
Germans could have been, and in some cases were, affected. Keep in mind that 
it is not a passive reaction to the Nazis that is being discussed, but nonviolent 
resistance. 
IYon-cooperation, general strikes, and other forms of nonviolent resistance, 
can go a long way towards changing the situation. Gandhi did not see what he 
did as passive. It was resistance, but it was nonviolent. The power of this type 
of resistance is even stronger when used early on. Still, one argument often 
heard is that once the soldiers roll into town, nonviolent resistance will not work. 
What, then, explains the "Prague Spring" of 1968?61 Soviet troops rolled into 
town and the people of Prague nonviolently refused to cooperate for eight 
months. The soldiers could do nothing. 
The next obvious question is: What happens once the violence starts? 
Nonviolent accompaniment lias saved many lives. There are multiple stories, but 
perhaps one of the best concerns the Minister of Defense for the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua, Ernesto Cardenal, who said that there was no violence when the 
unarmed peacekeepers were present. His interpreter changed his words to 
"alniost no violence" to which Cardenal then slammed his .fist on the table and 
shouted, "I said absolutely no violence."62 He would not allow it to be normalized. 
Neither should the UN. 
60 In particular I am referring to the Rosenstraube Prison Demonstration, which along with others, 
can be found in, Is There No Other Way, by Michael Nagler, 115-142. 
61 See Nagler, Is There No Other Way, 133-136. When Soviet troops rolled into Prague, the 
citizens practiced nonviolent resistance for eight months. 
62 Ibid, 239. 
Nonviolence is always a powerfi~l force. The above examples are 
primarily people who had no training in nonviolence and probably were not even 
aware 'that they were using the power of nonviolence. They were simply reacting 
in a manner that felt right and was effective. Imagine the power of nonviolence if 
practiced by trained people under the auspices of the UN. The potential is 
limitless. Nonviolence is so powerful precisely because violence is not inevitable. 
Violence is a choice. It is a learned response to a situation. It is an expected 
response within a system that derives its power from violence. Whereas a 
system that derived its power from nonviolence would be more powerful, as 
compassion and nurturing are inherently human. 
In addition, violence never works in the long run, and often does not work 
in the short run either. Look at two of the most recent UN peacekeeping 
disasters: Somalia and Bosnia. In both cases, the International community tried 
to use more violence than normal to change the situation. The results were 
disastrous. The result, however, was predictable; more violence. 
Violence suspends the achievement of what is desired, namely peace, 
while nonviolence moves towards the ultimate goal. The history of war has 
demonstrated that it does not work, at least without a huge cost and the creation 
of more and more structural violence. Nonviolence has not been tried sufficiently. 
So the choice is between something that moves the world away from peaceful 
goals and that has been shown empirically not to work, and something that 
moves the world towards these goals and that has worked many times, albeit on 
a smaller scale. The better choice seems obvious. 
Many also tout the virtues of just war theory. It seems that .the theory has 
two flaws as it might apply to peacekeeping. First, and most obvious is that it too 
relies on violence as the ultimate weapon. Second, is that the qualifications it 
sets forth for something to be a just war are not achievable within the current 
structural framework. Particularly, the "right intentions" criteria are impossible for 
an expansionist capitalist system. The current system within which the UN 
operates could easily be defined as such. The UN's current focus on 
development by exports is a part of that system. Their intentions cannot be 
considered "right" as long as that is the case.63 
Post Conflict: What Do We Do Now? 
One of the most important times in a nation's existence is the time after a 
conflict. The methods of ending the conflict, as stated above, are important, but 
equally important is the response after the conflict. The differences between 
"peacemaking" and "peacebuilding" are important to discuss here. 
Peacemakinq Peacebuildinq 
Reduces direct violence Reduces structural violence 
Emphasis on nonviolent means Emphasis on socially just ends 
Reactive Proactive 
Temporarily and spatially constrained Ubiquitous 
Prevention of violent episodes Promotion of social justice 
Interest in the status quo Threat to status 
Peacemaking, as defined above could be defined as what the UN does in 
its initial response to a violent outbreak. Peacebuilding is what the UN should be 
doing after a conflict and before conflicts occur. Even if the emphasis is on 
63 Jovana Davidovic, The Role of Right Intentions in Humanitarian Military Inten~entions, available 
at www.library.umaine.edu/theses/. 
64 Christie, 11. 
nonviolence, peacemaking will only bring about temporary peace if the 
underlying causes of violence are not addressed. Peacebuilding does this. It 
addresses the structural violence and acts to prevent violent outbreaks. Violent 
outbreaks are common following violent conflicts. While it is easy to see how 
peacebuilding would be valuable before conflict breaks out, many of the same 
issues are present after a conflict ends. 
As was discussed before; early detection of hot spots is an essential 
preventative measure. Many of the following issues are relevant for both pre and 
post conflict situations. They will be discussed in a post conflict context, but they 
can be applied anywhere as they are general conditions that should be met 
everywhere. Post conflict states require no broad assessment. The UN should 
go on the assumption that all of these areas will need to be addressed. 
There are several areas to cover: institutions, infrastructure, healthcare, 
economic, rule of law and justice, democratization or self-determination, 
reconcilia.tion, political structures, and more. All of these are daunting, but if 
handled outside of the structural violence of the present system, they become 
manageable. The UN does great things in these areas already. Most of the 
discussion will center on the major flaw in post conflict rebuilding, namely, 
development. 
The different issues in post conflict peaceb~~ilding are all very interrelated. 
For example, infrastructure and institutions are inextricably linked. For the 
purpose of this discussion, institutions represent the functions of the state, 
education, etc. Infrastructure will refer to the actual buildings, roads, bridges, 
commur~ications, etc. Healthcare will be included under institutions, but will also 
be its own category because of the immediate need for healthcare and medical 
treatment that invariably follows conflict. 
It is difficult, if not impossible to arrange all of these needs in a hierarchy. 
All are extremely important and most have to be confronted immediately. 
Infrastructure, which includes electricity, is important to insure that healthcare 
can operate and to insure that relief supplies can get to where they are needed. 
The size and scope of the UN makes it unique in its ability to convene the 
necessary resources for operations following conflicts. No other institution can 
bring as much to the table in this area. 
The rebuilding of infrastructure is important in another respect as well. It 
can create jobs that will undoubtedly be needed to bolster the local economy. 
The use of outside contractors and "experts" should be kept to an absolute . 
minimum. If there are locals capable of doing the job, they should do it. There 
should be no other agenda on the part of the UN. 
Electricity and communication are probably the two elements that should 
be addressed first. They will provide the basic needs for rebuilding other 
structures. The UN's role should be one of overall coordination, not dictation. 
Although it has done so in the past, the UN is not designed to run a state. If it is 
absolutely necessary for the UN to take on this role, it should involve as many 
locals as possible. 
The many NGOs that operate around the world will be invaluable to the 
UN in the area of healthcare. Agencies like the Red CrossICrescent and 
Medicins Sans Frontiers (Doctors without Borders) have experience in working in 
post conflict areas and, unlike the UN, are experts in the medical field. The 
partnerships and working relationships that the UN and these NGOs have built 
over the years will have to be strengthened. This is particularly important in light 
of recent operations in which the United States tried to link its invasion of 
Afghanistan with an aid mission, causing aid workers to lose the trust of the 
people of Afghanistan and become targets of military resistance forces. 
It is not impossible for the UN to know in advance what types of medical 
emergencies it will have on its hands in a post conflict environment. It has seen 
them before and should be prepared to the extent possible. The money it would 
be saving on military equipment and supplies could be put to this purpose. 
Since the UIV will know for the most part what it will be facing, it should be 
possible to have an automatic response team, one equipped to deal with those 
scenarios. This team should not need to be put together for each conflict; it 
should be a standing division. The UN needs to take advantage of what it does 
know and this is one of those things it knows well. The UN faces so many 
situations in which it does not know what to expect; it should take advantage of 
the fact .that in this case, it knows beforehand. 
Justice and rule of law are extremely important if a state is going to 
continue to be viable. While not as urgent as the medical or humanitarian crises, 
this will go a long way towards creating stability and a sense of belonging and 
control. If the population feels that they live in a place .that is reminiscent of the 
Wild West, they will not be able to develop and grow. Fear is a major cause of 
conflict. Rule of law, as decided by the people, will reduce that fear. The UN1s 
role should be one of oversight and coordination. 
Political structures and the level of self-determination are obviously related 
as well. It is important that political structures be stabilized on the local level first. 
The national level, although important, is secondary here. The focus of the UN is 
often to get federal governments up and running, but it is the local governments 
that provide the daily stability and the sense of belonging and safety so 
necessary to build the country back up. Through participation in the local 
government, which should be encouraged, it also empowers people to take pride 
in their community and have a sense of belonging and a sense of control over 
the events that shape their lives. These are things that the national government 
cannot do at the start. 
The idea of self-determination needs to be well defined. Some prefer 
democratization, but that seems to be more of an imposition than true self- 
determination. Perhaps it is because it is easy to link democracy to liberal 
democracy, which means automatic open markets and privatization. A true 
democracy, where people decide what form of government they will have, is what 
the UN should strive for. This is why local participation is so important. As for 
types of democracy, there are many: representative, participatory, etc. There 
should be no rush to hold national elections, as local elections are far more 
important and stabilizing. Forming a national interim government would be 
favorable to national elections happening before local governments are in place. 
Self-determination is a worthy goal to strive for, if it truly is self- 
determination. It cannot be the agenda of the UN or the permanent members of 
the Security Council, or anyone else. Self-determination that is mere rhetoric can 
be extremely dangerous. If it is not real, it will not hold for long without 
exploitation, oppressio~i, and even.tually violence. 
Reconciliation is also another important step in post conflict states. The 
cessation of violence will be ternporary if the underlying issues are not addressed 
in a public manner. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission is an 
example of what the UN should work towards. While the Commission was not 
perfect, the overall lesson it proved is that reconciliation allows for eventual 
forgiveness, and with forgiveness comes true rebuilding on a lasting foundation. 
It is important that the UN does not impose its idea of who sho~~ ld  be forgiven 
and when, this is something that cannot be rushed or manipulated. It is also 
important to stress that reconciliation does not necessarily mean forgetting or, 
more importantly, condoning the violence. 
Finally, comes the essential role of women. Far too many societies are 
oppressive to women. It is through education, not force, that the UN will be able 
to change this. There are religious implications to consider that, even if one 
thinks they are erroneous, many in the population may embrace. The UN must 
be careful not to tread on religious traditions that can cause more conflict. That 
is certainly not to say that the UN should let any argument, religious or otherwise, 
stand in its way of promoting gender equality. Education and support of 
nonviolent resistance movements will be the best path towards equality, not 
imposition. 
In addition to equality, it is extremely important to invoke a gender 
perspective into peacekeeping in general. War and conflict have vast gender 
impacts. Peace and equality between men and women are linked. It is often the 
gender gap that is at the base of the structural violence within a system. The UN 
has, in its rhetoric, recognized this fact and should continue to strive to 
understand the gender role as it applies to pea~ekeeping.'~ Any peacekeeping 
process that does not address the needs and perspectives of women is not going 
to lead to a lasting peace. A negotiation that leaves one half of the people 
unrepresented is not a true negotiation. Self-determination that leaves one half 
of the voices unheard is not real self-determination. Any peace that does not 
address these issues will be fated to fail, as these issues must be addressed 
sooner or later. This is comparable to the race issue in the United States. 
Current race issues are, at least in part, due to the United States' history of 
slavery. However, they are also due in part to the fact that the United States has 
never really confronted this issue as a nation. Consequently, race issues 
continue to trouble the United States. Similarly, gender issues will continue to be 
65 Olsson, I. On October 31, 2000, the Security Council-adopted resolution 1325 which 
addressed this issue specifically. 
a serious barrier to peace if not addressed. The sooner they are, the better for 
'all. 
The other major 'flaw in peacekeeping is development. The goal of the UIV 
in development should be clear and without covert agenda. It should solely be 
the peaceful and sustainable development of the country in question. Common 
sense then tells us 'that creating a self-sustaining economy is the primary job. 
Focusing the economy in too limited an area is bound to backfire, while focusing 
on exports is allowing the value within the country to leave. This is the self- 
serving agenda of the developed nations and not the agenda of sustainability for 
developing countries. Yes, these countries should have access to international 
trade, but not at the expense of local ownership and local control. 
The question then is: How does the UN contribute to the agenda of the 
developed world? The answer is that by encouraging open market economies as 
a part of development, in particular export specialization, as does David Ricardo, 
they are complicit in that agenda.66 Any knowledgeable investor would say that 
diversification, not specialization, is the key to creating a good portfolio, or in the 
case of countries, economies. Diverse economies are sustainable and weather 
economic changes better. It is destructive and dangerous advice that the UN, 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO are giving the developing nations. 
Post-conflict states are the worst place to implement market li beralization. 
According to Roland Paris, in At War's End, there are three main issues in post 
conflict states: 
1 ) Intense societal conflicts. 
2) Weak conflict dampeners. 
3) Ineffective political  institution^.^' 
66 Ricardo was an economic theorist in the early nineteenth century who put forth the ideas of 
specialization and competitive advantage. His theories are the basis of much of the free trade 
and globalization ideas today. 
67 Paris, 168-1 69. 
Given these three issues, what is the worst thing one could add to this 
situation? Weapons, of course would be first, but after that, competition for 
scarce resources would be a close second. This is exactly what market 
liberalization encourages. And if countries are also encouraged to focus on 
exports, as in the Nlillennium Development Goals of the UN, the competition is 
going to be that much more intense. This is poor planning and poor advice. 
Without the institutions capable of handling that competition it would be 
impossible for any country to create a sustainable economy without severe 
oppression. If one adds to the situation the fact that the country is just coming 
out of one conflict, and violence is likely to erupt once again. This is simply 
common sense. 
Regardless, the UN still pushes these developing countries to focus their 
efforts on these areas. It is important to note that the UN does not encompass 
the IMF and World Bank. These institutions, although under UN auspices, act 
independently of the UN and were designed to do so. The or~ly thing keeping 
them in touch with the UN at all is that the association with tlie UN gives them 
legitimacy. 
However, even without the Bretton Woods institutions, tlie UN has its own 
agencies in the mix, some good, some not so good, and as always, at cross 
purposes. To begin, there is UNlDO (United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization) which focuses mainly on technical assistance; WlPO (World 
Intellectual Property Organization) which focuses on intellectual property rights; 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) which is a UIV subsidiary that 
provides mainly technical assistance and experts; UNCTAD (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development) which was described by Nigel White as 
"concerned now with integrating LDCs (Least Developing Countries) into the 
rapidly globalizing and liberalizing world economy."68 
White goes on to say that this is a far cry from the original role, which was 
to act as a counter to the Bretton Woods Institutions. Now it works with them to 
attempt to get the LDCs to survive globalization. This is typical of current 
responses. Adjust everything to the problem instead of addressing the actual 
problem. 
There are two other concerns with the export specialization approach. 
The first is the environmental impact. Forests are being decimated, which leads 
to soil erosion and further problems. Although this is an issue far too large to 
cover adequately in this thesis, it is worth noting that this, along with resource 
control, will be one of the two major concerns for UN peacekeeping in the not to 
distant future. One can already see it with the conflicts over oil, but the resource 
wars of tomorrow will be over control of, and access to, water. There are already 
privatization attempts being made. As clean water becomes scarcer, the 
developed world will want more than its fair share and will do what it has to do to 
get it. The UN must address the environment and resource control as issues of 
peacekeeping, and not simply isolated events. The lesson should have been 
learned with poverty and health. The UIV and others ignored ,the connections for 
too long. The world cannot afford to do so in these two areas as well. 
68 White, 286. 
Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
The United Nations has been presented with an opportunity due to the fall 
of the Soviet Union. It no longer has to worry about two vastly different 
competing ideologies among the permanent members of the Security Council. 
This does not mean that it will be smooth sailing ahead; the last fifteen years 
have proven that. However, with changes in global power structures, inevitably 
come changes in the international institutions that serve those structures. The 
United Nations is not immune to those changes. 
Unfortunately, the UN has not taken advantage of its opportunities. While 
it has begun to attempt to understand the complexities involved with confronting 
conflict, its actions remain stuck in a different time. It is a different world than the 
one encountered after World War II. The first 45 years of the UN's existence 
were mired in a Cold War stalemate. The last fifteen have seen a dramatic rise 
in the number of peacekeeping missions at the UN. While some of this can be 
attributed to the end of the stalemate, that alone does not do a sufficient job in 
explaining the increase. 
The gap between those who have much, the so-called developed 
countries, and those who have little or nothing, the developing countries, is 
growing year after year. Global poverty is destroying communities. The 
destruction of communities leaves people without a sense of belonging or a 
sense of purpose. The poor of the world feel powerless against the powers that 
be. This feeling of powerlessness is not insurmountable, however. They 
possess, like all people do, the power of nonviolence. 
The United Nations, as a leader towards a just and peaceful world, must 
help people tap into that power. If it does not, the need for its "peacekeeping" 
services will continue to rise. The UN has a choice to make; continue down the 
same path that will inevitably lead to increased global violence, or change tactics 
and embrace the one power that the developing nations have in equal strength 
with the developed nations: nonviolent resistance. 
If the UN accepts this role, it must embrace nonviolence as the basis for 
its peacekeeping efforts. The vast majority of its efforts and use of resources 
should be consistent with its goal of peace and the principles of nonviolence. 
The UN's role in preventing conflict will be most important, and this is the area 
that nonviolence will be most useful. How the UIV works toward preventing 
conflict will set the tone for the settlement of disputes in the future. 
The time after a conflict is also vitally important. People who have just 
survived devastating violence, loss of loved ones, and all of the atrocities of war, 
will need to be educated about alternative ways of resolving issues. The UN is 
the only organization with the size and scope to effectively organize this task. 
The most difficult question for the UN is how to respond to ongoing 
violence. While ideally nonviolence should be used, in the form of peace 
brigades or unarmed peacekeepers, to respond to all conflicts, one can easily 
imagine a situation where, despite the best efforts of all involved, the UN will 
need to authorize the use of force. Rwanda, Sudan, and Kosovo come to mind. 
It could easily be considered an act of violence to stand by doing nothing while a 
person is being killed or raped. It is certainly not the intention of this thesis to 
advocate standing by. Violence must be stopped, as the ultimate goal is to 
reduce the overall level of violence. 
There are a few points that are important in the consideration of this 
complex issue. First, and most important, is that the use of force should truly be 
a last resort. If teams of unarmed peacekeepers are sent in and are unable to 
stop the violence, force may have to be used. But this is only after nonviolence 
is tried on a significant scale. Second, the use of force should not be glorified in 
any way. l t  is, and should be seen as, a failure. Violence is the method of the 
person who has run out of ideas. It is a failure of human compassion and reason. 
As Gandhi stated, "Victory attained by violence is tantamount to a defeat, for it is 
momentary."6g 
The most important things for the UN are trustworthiness and consistency. 
The UN must be impartial and fair, to its utmost ability, at all times. No amount of 
back room dealing should deter it from its mission of peace. If it is perceived as 
a tool for the developed nations, its effectiveness will be extremely impaired and 
it will truly become not just irrelevant, but harmful. 
A consistent LIN will be an effective UN. Humanitarian aid and 
development programs should not be at cross-purposes as they are now. The 
values of the UN include fairness and equality. Its efforts in peacekeeping and in 
creating a culture of peace should be consistent with these values. 
69 Mahatma Gandhi, Satyagraha Leaflet No. 13. May 191 9. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
CHAPTERS VI AND VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 
CHAPTER Vl 
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPU'TES 
Article 33 
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek 
a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice. 
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties 
to settle their dispute by such means. 
Article 34 
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might 
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine 
whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
Article 35 
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation 
of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security 
Council or of the General Assembly. 
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the 
attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute 
to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the 
dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present 
Charter. 
3. The proceedings of the General Asserr~bly in respect of matters brought to 
its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 
and 12. 
Article 36 
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred 
to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate 
procedures or metliods of adjustment. 
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for 
the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the 
parties. 
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should 
also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be 
referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance 
with the provisions of the Statute of the Court. 
Article 37 
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to 
settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the 
Security Council. 
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it 
shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such 
terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. 
Article 38 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, 
if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties 
with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute. 
CHAPTER VII 
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE 
PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION 
Article 39 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Article 40 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, 
before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for 
in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional 
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall 
be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. 
The Security Co~~nc i l  shall duly take account of failure to comply with such 
provisional measures. 
Article 41 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations. 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and 
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
Article 43 
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make 
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a 
special agreement or'agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security. 
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of 
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of 
the facilities and assistance to be provided. 
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on 
the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the 
Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and 
groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory 
states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 
Article 44 
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a 
Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the 
obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so 
desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the 
employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces. 
Article 45 
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members 
shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined 
international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these 
contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the 
limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, 
by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. 
Article 46 
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council 
with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. 
Article 47 
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist 
the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's 
military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, 
the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. 
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the 
permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any 
Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the 
Committee shall be invited by ,the Committee to be associated with it when 
the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the 
participation of that Member in its work. 
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security 
Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the 
disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of 
such forces shall be worked out subsequently. 
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council 
and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish 
regional sub-committees. 
Article 48 
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for 
the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all 
the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security 
Council may determine. 
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations 
directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies 
of which they are members. 
Article 49 
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in 
carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. 
Article 50 
If preventive or enforcement nieasures against any state are taken by the 
Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, 
which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the 
carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security 
Council with regard to a solution of those problems. 
Article 51 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Appendix B 
PARTIAL SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY 
GENERAL'S HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES, AND 
CHANGE 
Part Two 
Collective security and the challenge of prevention 
Poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation 
1. All States must recommit themselves to the goals of eradicating poverty, 
achieving sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development. 
(59) 
2. The many donor countries which currently fall short of the United Nation s 
0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) for official development assistance 
(ODA) should establish a timetable for reaching it. (60) 
3. World Trade Organization (WTO) members should strive to conclude the Doha 
development round of multilateral trade negotiations at the latest in 2006. (62) 
4. Lender Governments and the international financial institutions should provide 
highly indebted poor countries with greater debt relief, longer rescheduling and 
improved access to global markets. (63) 
5. Although international resources devoted to meeting the challenge of 
HIVIAIDS have increased from about $250 million in 1996 to about $2.8 billion in 
2002, more than $10 billion annually is needed to stem the pandemic. (64) 
6. Leaders of countries affected by HIVI AIDS need to mobilize resources, 
commit funds and engage civil society and the private sector in disease -control 
efforts. (65) 
7. The Security Council, working closely with UNAIDS, should host a second 
special session on HIVIAIDS as a .threat to international peace and security, to 
explore the future effects of HIVIAIDS 011 States and societies, generate research 
on 
the problem and identify critical steps towards a long-term strategy for 
diminishing 
the threat. (67) 
8. International donors, in partnership wit h national authorities and local civil 
society organizations, should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild 
local 
and national public health systems throughout the developing world. (68) 
9. Members of the World Health Assembly should provide greater resources to 
the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
IVetwork to increase its capacity to cope with potential disease outbreaks. (69) 
10. States should provide incentives for the further development of renewable 
energy sources and begin to phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, 
especially 
for fossil fuel use and development. (71) 
11 .  We urge Member States to reflect on the gap between the promise of the 
Kyoto 
Protocol and its performance, re -engage on the problem of global warming and 
begin new negotiations to produce a new long -term strategy for reducing global 
warming beyond the period covered by the Protocol (2012). (72) 
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Conflict between and within States 
12. The Security Council should stand ready to use the authority it has under the 
Rome Statute to refer cases of suspected war crimes and crimes against 
humanity to 
the International Criminal Court. (90) 
13. The United Nations sho~~ ld  work with national authorities, international 
financial institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to develop 
norms governing the management of natural resources for countries emerging 
from 
or at risk of conflict. (92) 
14. The United Nations should build on the experience of regional organizations 
in 
developing frameworks for minority rights and the protection of democratically 
elected Governments from unconstitutional overthrow. (94) 
15. Member States should expedite and conclude negotiations on legally binding 
agreements on the marking and tracing, as well as the brokering and transfer, of 
small arms and light weapons. (96) 
16. All Member States should report completely and accurately on all elements of 
the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the Secretary -General 
should be asked to report annually to the General Assembly and Security Council 
on 
any inadequacies in the reporting. (97) 
17. A training and briefing facility should be established for new or potential 
special representatives of the Secretary -General and other United Nations 
mediators. 
(101 ) 
18. The Departnient of Political Affairs should be given additional resources and 
should be restructured to provide more consistent and professional mediation 
support. ( I  02) 
19. While the details of such a restructuring should be left to the Secretary - 
General, it should take into account the need for the United Nations to have: 
(a) A field -oriented, dedicated mediation support capacity, comprised of a 
small team of professionals with relevant direct experience and expertise, 
available 
to all United Nations mediators; 
(b) Competence on thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations, such as 
the sequencing of implementation steps, the design of monitoring arrangements, 
the 
sequencing of transitional arrangements and the design of national reconciliation 
mechanisms; 
(c) Greater interaction with national mediators, regional organizations and 
non-governmental orgar~izations involved in conflict resolution; 
(d) Greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of 
important voices from civil society, especially those of women, who are often 
neglected during negotiations. (1 03) 
20. National leaders and parties to conflict should make constructive use of the 
op'tion of preventive deployment of peacekeepers. (1 04) 
8 1 
A1591565 
Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons 
21. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament: 
(a) They must honour their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on 
the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be 
ready to undertake specific measures in fulfillment of those commitments; 
(b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear 
weapons against non -nuclear-weapon States. (120) 
22. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States 
and States not party to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, 
including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their 
strategic nuclear weapons. (1 21 ) 
23. The Security Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in 
response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non -nuclear 
weapon State. (1 22) 
24. Negotiations to resolve regional conflicts should include confidence-building 
measures and steps towards disarmament. (123) 
25. States not party to the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, 
demonstrating 
their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test-Ban Treaty and 
supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut -off treaty, both of which are 
open 
to nuclear-weapon and non -nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that 
peace 
efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that 
could lead to the establishment of nuclear -weapon-free zones in those regions 
similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the 
South 
Pacific and South -East Asia. (124) 
26. All chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all 
existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012. (1 25) 
27. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should 
without 
delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active 
participation of the biotechnology industry. (1 26) 
28. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today's standard for IAEA 
safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of 
serious 
concern over non-compliance with non -proliferation and safeguards standards. 
(129) 
29. Negotiations should be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early 
conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Articles Ill and 
IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the 
supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. (1 30) 
30. While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without 
surrendering the right under the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of IVuclear 
Weapons 
to construct uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, voluntarily institute a 
time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further such facilities, with a 
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commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile 
materials by the current suppliers at market rates. (131) 
31. All States should be encouraged to join the voluntary Proliferation Security 
Initiative. (1 32) 
32. A State's notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the 
Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of 
Governors shol~ld resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided 
by 
IAEA should be withdrawn. (1 34) 
33. The proposed timeline for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert 
highly enriched uranium reactors and reduce HEU stockpiles should be halved 
from 
10 to five years. (1 35) 
34. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should 
negotiate a new bio -security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and 
establish binding international standards for the export of such a gents. (1 37) 
35. The Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to 
negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut -off treaty that, on a designated schedule, 
ends the production of highly enriched uranium for non -weapon as well as 
weapons 
purposes. (1 38) 
36. The Directors -General of IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) should be invited by the Security Council to report 
to it 
twice -yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as 
on any 
serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the 
Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. (1 40) 
37. The Security Council should consult with the WHO Director - General to 
establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a 
suspicious 
or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. (144) 
Terrorism 
38. The United Nations, with the Secretary -General taking a leading role, should 
promote a comprehensive strategy against terrorism, including: 
(a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, 
including through promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and 
democratic reform; working to end occupations and address major political 
grievances; combating organized crime; reducing poverty and unemployment; 
and 
stopping State collapse; 
(b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through 
education and fostering public debate; 
(c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism 
cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and 
human rights, including in the areas of law enforcement; intelligence -sharing, 
where 
possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls; 
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(d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations; 
(e) Control of dangerous materials and public health defense. (148) 
39. Member States that have not yet done so should actively consider signing 
and 
ratifying all 12 international conventions against terrorism, and should adopt the 
eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing issued by the 
Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (0ECD)-supported Financial Action 
Task Force on Money -Laundering and the measures recommended in its 
various 
best practices papers. (1 50) 
40. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a process for 
reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions claiming to have been wrongly 
placed or retained on its watch lists. (1 52) 
41. The Security Council, after consultation with affected States, should extend 
the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to act as a clearing 
house for State -to -State provision of military, police and border control 
assistance 
for the development of domestic counter-terrorism capacities. (1 54) 
42. To help Member States comply with their counter -terrorism obligations, the 
United Nations should establish a capacity -building trust fund under the Counter- 
Terrorism Executive Directorate. (1 55) 
43. The Security Council should devise a schedule of predetermined sanctions 
for 
State non-compliance with the Council's counter-terrorism resolutions. (1 56) 
44. The General Assembly should rapidly complete negotiations on a 
comprehensive convention on terrorism, incorporating a definition of terrorism 
with 
the following elements: 
(a) Recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is 
regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient 
scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against 
humanity; 
(b) Restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions 
are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; and 
restatement .that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols; 
(c) Reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security 
Council 
resolution 1566 (2004); 
(d) Description of terrorism as "any action, in addition to actions already 
specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva 
Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to 
cause 
death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non -combatants, when the purpose 
of 
such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any a 
ct". 
(1 63-1 64) 
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Transnational organized crime 
45. Member States that have not signed, ratified or resourced the 2000 United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three 
Protocols, 
and the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption should do so, and all 
Member States should support the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 
its 
work in this area. (172) 
46. Member States should establish a central authority to facilitate the exchange 
of 
evidence among national judicial authorities, mutual legal assistance among 
prosecutorial authorities and the implementation of extradition requests. (1 73) 
47. A comprehensive international convention on money -laundering that 
addresses 
the issues of bank secrecy and the development of financial havens needs to be 
negotiated, and endorsed by the General Assembly. (174) 
48. Member States should sign and ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and parties to the 
Protocol should take all necessary steps to effectively implement it. (1 75) 
49. The United Nations should establish a robust capacity-building mechanism 
for rule -of-law assistance. (1 77) 
The role of sanctions 
50. The Security Council must ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented 
and enforced: 
(a) When the Security Council imposes a sanctions regime - including arms 
embargoes - it should routinely establish monitoring mechanisms and provide 
them with the necessary authority and capacity to carry out high -quality, in - 
depth 
investigations. Adequate budgetary provisions must be made to implement those 
mechanisms; 
(b) Security Council sanctions committees should be mandated to develop 
improved guidelines and reporting procedures to assist States in sanction s 
implementation, and to improve procedures for maintaining accurate lists of 
individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions; 
(c) The Secretary -General should appoint a senior official with sufficient 
supporting resources to enable the Secretary -General to supply the Security 
Council 
with analysis of the best way to target sanctions and to assist in coordinating 
their 
implementation. This official would also assist compliance efforts; identify 
technical assistance needs and coordinate such assistance; and make 
recommendations on any adjustments necessary to enhance the effectiveness of 
sanctions; 
(d) Donors should devote more resources to strengthening the legal, 
administrative, and policing and border-control capacity of Member States to 
implement sanctions. Capacity -building measures should include efforts to 
improve 
air-traffic interdiction in zones of conflict; 
(e) The Security Council should, in instances of verified, chronic violations, 
impose secondary sanctions against those involved in sanctions -busting; 
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(f) The Secretary -General, in consultation with the Security Council, should 
ensure that an appropriate auditing mechanism is in place to oversee sanctions 
administration. (1 80) 
51. Sanctions committees should improve procedures for providing humanitarian 
exemptions and routinely conduct assessments of the humanitarian impact'of 
sanctions. The Security Council should continue to strive to mitigate the 
humanitarian consequences of sanctions. (1 81 ) 
52. Where sanctions involve lists of individuals or entities, sanctions committees 
should establish procedures to review the cases of those claiming to have been 
incorrectly placed or retained on such lists. (1 82) 
Part Three 
Collective security and the use of force 
Using force: rules and guidelines 
53. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations should be neither rewritten nor 
reinterpreted, either to extend its long-established scope (so as to allow 
preventive 
measures to non -imminent threats) or to restrict it (so as to allow its application 
only to actual attacks). (1 92) 
54. The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which States 
a re 
concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source 
of 
authority but to make the Council work better than it has. (198) 
55. The Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective international 
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military 
intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large -scale killing, 
ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign 
Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. (203) 
56. In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the 
Security Council should always address - whatever other considerations it may 
take into account - at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy: 
(a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security 
of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of 
military 
force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large - 
scale 
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
actual or imminently apprehended? 
(b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed 
military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes 
or 
motives may be involved? 
(c) Last resod . Has every non -military option for meeting the threat in 
question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other 
measures 
will not succeed? 
(d) Propotfional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed 
military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question? 
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(e) Balance of consequences . Is there a reasonable chance of the military 
action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences 
of 
action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? (207) 
57. The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be embodied in 
declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly. (208) 
Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability 
58. The developed States should do more to transform their existing force 
capacities into suitable contingents for peace operations. (21 6) 
59. Member States should strongly support the efforts of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations of the Unite d Nations Secretariat, building on the 
important work of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see Al55/305 - 
S/2000/809), to improve its use of strategic deployment stockpiles, standby 
arrangements, trust funds and other mechanisms in order to meet the tighter 
deadlines necessary for effective deployment. (21 8) 
60. States with advanced military capacities should establish standby high 
readiness, self-sufficient battalions at up to brigade level that can reinforce 
United 
Nations missions, and should p lace them at the disposal of the United Nations. 
(21 9) 
61. The Secretary -General should recommend and the Security Council should 
authorize troop strengths for peacekeeping missions that are sufficient to deter 
and 
repel hostile factions. (222) 
62. The United Nations should have a small corps of senior police officers and 
managers (50-1 00 personnel) who could undertake mission assessments and 
organize the start -up of police components of peace operations, and the General 
Assembly should authorize this capacity. (223) 
Post-conflict peacebuilding 
63. Special representatives of the Secretary -General should have the authority 
and 
guidance to work with relevant parties to establish robust donor-coordinating 
mechanisms, as well as the resources to pelform coordination functions 
effectively, 
including ensuring that the sequencing of United Nations assessments and 
activities 
is consistent with Government priorities. (226) 
64. The Security Council should mandate and the General Assembly should 
authorize funding for disarmament and demobilization programmes from 
assessed 
budgets for United Nations peacekeeping operations. (227) 
65. A standing fund for peacebuilding should be established at the level of at 
least 
$250 million that can be used to finance the recurrent expenditures of a nascent 
Government, as well as critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation 
and reintegration. (228) 
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Protecting civilians 
66. All combatants must abide by the Geneva Conventions. All Member States 
should sign, ratify and act on all treaties relating to the protection of civilians, 
such 
as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and all refugee conventions. (233) 
67. The Security Council should fully implement resolution 1265 (1 999) on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict. (237) 
68. The Security Council, United Nations agencies and Member States should 
fully itr~plement resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. (238) 
69. Member States should support and fully fund the proposed Directorate of 
Security and accord high priority to assisting the Secretary -General in 
implementing 
a new staff security system in 2005. (239) 
Appendix C 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL ON 
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMEhlDATIONS 
1. Preventive action: 
(a) The Panel endorses the recommendations of the 
Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention 
contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks 
before the Security Council's second open meeting on 
conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his 
appeal to "all who are engaged in conflict prevention 
and development - the United Nations, the Bretton 
Woods institutions, Governments and civil society 
organizations - [to] address these challenges in a 
more integrated fashion"; 
(b) The Panel supports the Secretary-General's more 
frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of 
tension, and stresses Member States' obligations, 
under Article 2(5) of the Charter, to give "every 
assistance" to such activities of the United Nations. 
2. Peace-building strategy: 
(a) A small percentage of a mission's first-year budget 
should be made available to the representative or 
special representative of the Secretary-General 
leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its 
area of operations, with the advice of the Urrited 
Nations country team's resident coordinator; 
(b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use 
of civilian police, other rule of law elements and 
human rights experts in complex peace operations to 
reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law 
institutions and improving respect for human rights in 
post-conflict environments; 
(c) The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies 
consider bringing demobilization and reintegration 
programmes into the assessed budgets of complex 
peace operations for the first phase of an operation in 
order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting 
factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict; 
(d) The Panel recommends that the Executive 
Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) discuss 
and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to 
strengthen the permanent capacity of the United 
Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to 
implement programmes in support of those strategies. 
3. Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy: 
Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to 
carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be 
capable of defending themselves, other mission components and 
the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against 
those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or 
otherwise seek to undermine it by violence. 
4. Clear, credible and achievable mandates: 
(a) The Panel recommends that, before the Security 
Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace 
agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping 
operation, the Council assure itself that the 
agreement meets threshold conditions, such as 
consistency with international human rights standards 
and practicability of specified tasks and timelines; 
(b) The Security Council should leave in draft form 
resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop 
levels until such time as the Secretary-General has 
firm commitments of troops and other critical mission 
support elements, including peace-building elements, 
from Member States; 
(c) Security Council resolutions should meet the 
requirements of peacekeeping operations when they 
deploy into potentially dangerous situations, 
especially the need for a clear chain of command and 
unity of effort; 
(d) The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what 
it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when 
formulating or changing mission mandates, and 
countries that have committed military units to an 
operation should have access to Secretariat briefings 
to the Council on matters affecting the safety and 
security of their personnel, especially those meetings 
with implications for a mission's use of force. 
5. lnformation and strategic analysis: 
The Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here 
as the ECPS lnformation and Strategic Analysis Secretariat 
(EISAS), which would support the information and analysis needs 
of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be 
administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO). 
6. Transitional civil administration: 
The Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of 
international legal experts, including individuals with experience in 
United Nations operations that have transitional administration 
mandates, to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an 
interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially 
required, for use by such operations pending the re-establishment 
of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity. 
7. Determining deployment timelines: 
The United Nations should define "rapid and effective deployment 
capacities" as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully 
deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the 
adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the 
case of complex peacekeeping operations. 
8. Mission leadership: 
(a) The Secretary-General should systematize the 
method of selecting mission leaders, beginning with 
the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential 
representatives or special representatives of the 
Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police 
commissioners, and their deputies and other heads of 
substantive and administrative components, within a 
fair geographic and gender distribution and with input 
,from Member States; 
(b) The entire leadership of a mission should be 
selected and assembled at Headquarters as early as 
possible in order to enable their participation in key 
aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings 
on the situation in the mission area and to meet and 
work with their colleagues in mission leadership; 
(c) The Secretariat sliould routinely provide the 
mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans 
for anticipating and overcoming challenges to 
mandate implementation, and whenever possible 
should formulate such guidance and plans together 
with the mission leadership. 
9. Military personnel: 
(a) Member States should be encouraged, where 
appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one 
another, within the context of the United Nations 
Stand by Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form 
several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary 
enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 
30 days of the adoption of a Security Council 
resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping 
operation and within 90 days for complex 
peacekeeping operations; 
(b) The Secretary-General should be given the 
authority to formally canvass Member States 
participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to 
contribute troops to a potential operation, once it 
appeared likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement 
envisaging an implementing role for the United 
Nations, might be reached; 
(c) The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, 
send a team to confirm the preparedness of each 
potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of 
the memoranda of understanding on the requisite 
training and equipment requirements, prior to 
deployment; those that do not meet the requirements 
must not deploy; 
(d) The Panel recommends that a revolving "on-call 
list" of about 100 military officers be created in 
UNSAS to be available on seven days' notice to 
augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained 
to create a mission headquarters for a new 
peacekeeping operation. 
10. Civilian police personnel: 
(a) Member States are encouraged to each establish 
a national pool of civilian police officers that would be 
ready for deployment to United Nations peace 
operations on short notice, within the context of the 
United Nations Stand by Arrangements System; 
(b) Member States are encouraged to enter into 
regional training partnerships for civilian police in the 
respective national pools, to promote a common level 
of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, 
standard operating procedures and performance 
standards to be promulgated by the United Nations; 
(c) Members States are encouraged to designate a 
single point of contact within their governmental 
structures for the provision of civilian police to United 
Nations peace operations; 
(d) The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list 
of about 100 police officers and related experts be 
created in UNSAS to be available on seven days' 
notice with teams trained to create the civilian police 
component of a new peacekeeping operation, train 
incoming personnel and give the component greater 
coherence at an early date; 
(e) The Panel recommends that parallel 
arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) 
above be established for judicial, penal, human rights 
and other relevant specialists, who with specialist 
civilian police will make LIP collegial "rule of law" 
teams. 
11. Civilian specialists: 
(a) The Secretariat should establish a central 
Internetllntranet-based roster of pre-selected civilian 
candidates available to deploy to peace operations on 
short notice. The field missions should be granted 
access to and delegated authority to recruit 
candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on 
fair geographic and gender distribution to be 
promulgated by the Secretariat; 
(b) The Field Service category of personnel should be 
reformed to mirror the recurrent demands faced by all 
peace operations, especially at the mid- to senior- 
levels in the administrative and logistics areas; 
(c) Conditions of service for externally recruited 
civilian staff should be revised to enable the United 
Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates, 
and to then offer those who have served with 
distinction greater career prospects; 
(d) DPKO should formulate a comprehensive staffing 
strategy for peace operations, outlining, among other 
issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby 
arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel 
on 72 hours' notice to facilitate mission start-up, and 
the divisions of responsibility among the members of 
the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for 
implementing that strategy. 
12. Rapidly deployable capacity for public information: 
Additional resources should be devoted in mission budgets to 
public information and the associated personnel and information 
technology required to get an operation's message out and build 
effective internal communications links. 
13. Logistics support and expenditure management: 
(a) The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics 
support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission 
deployment within the timelines proposed and 
corresponding to planning assumptions established 
by 'the substantive offices of DPKO; 
(b) The General Assembly should authorize and 
approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least 
five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should 
include rapidly deployable communications 
equipment. These start-up kits should then be 
routinely replenished with funding from the assessed 
contributions to the operations that drew on them; 
(c) The Secretary-General should be given authority 
to draw up to US$50 million from the Peacekeeping 
Reserve Fund, once it became clear that an operation 
was likely to be established, with the approval of the 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions (ACABQ) but prior to the adoption of a 
Security Council resolution; 
(d) The Secretariat should undertake a review of the 
entire procurement policies and procedures (with 
proposals to the General Assembly for amendments 
to the Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), 
to facilitate in particular the rapid and full deployment 
of an operation within the proposed timelines; 
(e) The Secretariat should conduct a review of the 
policies and procedures governing the management 
of financial resources in the field missions with a view 
to providing field missions with much greater flexibility 
in the management of their budgets; 
(f) The Secretariat should increase the level of 
procurement authority delegated to the field missions 
(from $200,000 to as high as $1 million, depending on 
mission size and needs) for all goods and services 
that are available locally and are not covered under 
systems contracts or standing commercial services 
contracts. 
14. Funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations: 
(a) The Panel recommends a substantial increase in 
resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping 
operations, and urges the Secretary-General to 
submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining 
his requirements in full; 
(b) Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be 
treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and 
as such the majority of its resource requirements for 
this purpose should be funded through the 
mechanism of the regular biennial programme budget 
of the Organization; 
(c) Pending the preparation of the next regular budget 
submission, the Panel recommends that the 
Secretary-General approach the General Assembly 
with a request for an emergency supplemental 
increase. to the Support Account to allow immediate 
recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in 
DPKO. 
15. lntegrated mission planning and support: 
lntegrated Mission Task Forces (IM-TFs), with members seconded 
from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, should 
be the standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support. 
IMTFs should serve as the first point of contact for all such support, 
and IlWTF leaders should have temporary line authority over 
seconded personnel, in accordance with agreenients between 
DPKO, DPA and other contributing departments, programmes, 
funds and agencies. 
16. Other structural adjustments in DPKO: 
(a) The current Military and Civilian Police Division 
should be restructured, moving the Civilian Police Unit 
out of the military reporting chain. Consideration 
should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the 
Civilian Police Adviser; 
(b) The Military Adviser's Office in DPKO should be 
restructured to correspond more closely to the way in 
which the military field headquarters in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations are structured; 
(c) A new unit should be established in DPKO and 
staffed with the relevant expertise for the provision of 
advice on criminal law issues that are critical to the 
effective use of civilian police in the United Nations 
peace operations; 
(d) The Under-Secretary-General for Management 
should delegate authority and responsibility for 
peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement 
functions to the Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period; 
(e) The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially 
enhanced and moved into a revamped DPKO Office 
of Operations; 
(f) Consideration should be given to increasing the 
number of Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO 
from two to three, with one of the three designated as 
the "Principal Assistant Secretary-General" and 
functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary- 
General. 
17. Operational support for public information: 
A unit for operational planning and support of public information in 
peace operations should be established, either within DPKO or 
within a new Peace and Security lnformation Service in the 
Department of Public lnformation (DPI) reporting directly to the 
Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public 
Information. 
18. Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs: 
(a) The Panel supports the Secretariat's effort to 
create a pilot Peace-building Unit within DPA, in 
cooperation with other integral United Nations 
elements, and suggests that regular budgetary 
support for this unit be revisited by the membership if 
the pilot programme works well. This programme 
should be evaluated in the context of guidance the 
Panel has provided in paragraph 46 above, and if 
considered the best available option for strengthening 
United Nations peace-building capacity it should be 
presented to the Secretary-General within the context 
of the Panel's recommendation contained in 
paragraph 47 (d) above; 
(b) The Panel recommends that regular budget 
resources for Electoral Assistance Division 
programmatic expenses be substantially increased to 
meet the rapidly growing demand for its services, in 
lieu of voluntary contributions; 
(c) To relieve demand on the Field Administration and 
Logistics Division (FALD) and the executive office of 
DPA, and to improve support services rendered to 
smaller political and peace-building field offices, the 
Panel recommends that procurement, logistics, staff 
recruitment and other support services for all such 
smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the 
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). 
19. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights: 
The Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission 
planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with funding partly 
from the regular budget and partly from peace operations mission 
budgets. 
20. Peace operations and the information age: 
(a) Headquarters peace and security departments 
need a responsibility centre to devise and oversee the 
implementation of common information technology 
strategy and training for peace operations, residing in 
EISAS. Mission counterparts to the responsibility 
centre should also be appointed to serve in the offices 
of the special representatives of the Secretary- 
General in complex peace operations to oversee the 
implementation of that strategy; 
(b) EISAS, in cooperation with the Information 
Technology Services Division (ITSD), should 
implement an enhanced peace operations element on 
the current United Nations lntranet and link it to the 
missions through a Peace Operations Extranet 
(POE); 
(c) Peace operations could benefit greatly from more 
extensive use of geographic information systems 
(GIs) technology, which quickly integrates operational 
information with electronic maps of the mission area, 
for applications as diverse as demobilization, civilian 
policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring 
and reconstruction; 
(d) The IT needs of mission components with unique 
information technology needs, such as civilian police 
and human rights, should be anticipated. and met 
more consistently in mission planning and 
implementation; 
(e) The Panel encourages the development of web 
site co-management by Headquarters and the field 
missions, in which Headquarters would maintain 
oversight but individual missions would have staff 
authorized to produce and post web content that 
conforms to basic presentational standards and 
policy. 
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